package daemon

import (
	"context"
	"fmt"
	"strconv"
	"strings"

	"banger/internal/guestconfig"
	"banger/internal/guestnet"
	"banger/internal/model"
	"banger/internal/roothelper"
	"banger/internal/system"
)

type workDiskPreparation struct {
	ClonedFromSeed bool
}

func (s *VMService) ensureSystemOverlay(ctx context.Context, vm *model.VMRecord) error {
	if exists(vm.Runtime.SystemOverlay) {
		return nil
	}
	_, err := s.runner.Run(ctx, "truncate", "-s", strconv.FormatInt(vm.Spec.SystemOverlaySizeByte, 10), vm.Runtime.SystemOverlay)
	return err
}

// patchRootOverlay writes the per-VM config files (resolv.conf,
// hostname, hosts, sshd drop-in, network bootstrap, fstab) into the
// rootfs overlay. The start flow passes the DM device path explicitly so the
// owner daemon can hand the privileged ext4 work to the root helper without
// rereading mutable process state.
func (s *VMService) patchRootOverlay(ctx context.Context, vm model.VMRecord, image model.Image, dmDev string) error {
	if strings.TrimSpace(dmDev) == "" {
		return fmt.Errorf("vm %q: DM device is required", vm.ID)
	}
	resolv := []byte(fmt.Sprintf("nameserver %s\n", s.config.DefaultDNS))
	hostname := []byte(vm.Name + "\n")
	hosts := []byte(fmt.Sprintf("127.0.0.1 localhost\n127.0.1.1 %s\n", vm.Name))
	sshdConfig := []byte(sshdGuestConfig())
	fstabBytes, err := s.privOps().ReadExt4File(ctx, dmDev, "/etc/fstab")
	fstab := string(fstabBytes)
	if err != nil {
		fstab = ""
	}
	builder := guestconfig.NewBuilder()
	builder.WriteFile("/etc/resolv.conf", resolv)
	builder.WriteFile("/etc/hostname", hostname)
	builder.WriteFile("/etc/hosts", hosts)
	builder.WriteFile(guestnet.ConfigPath, guestnet.ConfigFile(vm.Runtime.GuestIP, s.config.BridgeIP, s.config.DefaultDNS))
	builder.WriteFile(guestnet.GuestScriptPath, []byte(guestnet.BootstrapScript()))
	builder.WriteFile("/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/99-banger.conf", sshdConfig)
	builder.DropMountTarget("/home")
	builder.DropMountTarget("/var")
	builder.AddMount(guestconfig.MountSpec{
		Source:  "tmpfs",
		Target:  "/run",
		FSType:  "tmpfs",
		Options: []string{"defaults", "nodev", "nosuid", "mode=0755"},
		Dump:    0,
		Pass:    0,
	})
	builder.AddMount(guestconfig.MountSpec{
		Source:  "tmpfs",
		Target:  "/tmp",
		FSType:  "tmpfs",
		Options: []string{"defaults", "nodev", "nosuid", "mode=1777"},
		Dump:    0,
		Pass:    0,
	})
	s.capHooks.contributeGuest(builder, vm, image)
	builder.WriteFile("/etc/fstab", []byte(builder.RenderFSTab(fstab)))
	files := builder.Files()
	writes := make([]roothelper.Ext4Write, 0, len(files))
	for _, guestPath := range builder.FilePaths() {
		mode := uint32(0o644)
		if guestPath == guestnet.GuestScriptPath {
			mode = 0o755
		}
		writes = append(writes, roothelper.Ext4Write{
			GuestPath: guestPath,
			Data:      files[guestPath],
			Mode:      mode,
		})
	}
	return s.privOps().WriteExt4Files(ctx, dmDev, writes)
}

func (s *VMService) ensureWorkDisk(ctx context.Context, vm *model.VMRecord, image model.Image) (workDiskPreparation, error) {
	if exists(vm.Runtime.WorkDiskPath) {
		return workDiskPreparation{}, nil
	}
	if exists(image.WorkSeedPath) {
		vmCreateStage(ctx, "prepare_work_disk", "applying work seed")
		// Old flow used CopyFilePreferClone + (e2fsck + resize2fs).
		// On filesystems without reflink support that meant pushing
		// every byte of a 512+ MiB seed through the kernel followed
		// by a full fsck/resize, even though the seed itself only
		// holds a few KB of dotfiles. mkfs + ingest runs in roughly
		// a second regardless of seed or work-disk size.
		if err := system.MaterializeWorkDisk(ctx, s.runner, image.WorkSeedPath, vm.Runtime.WorkDiskPath, vm.Spec.WorkDiskSizeBytes); err != nil {
			return workDiskPreparation{}, err
		}
		return workDiskPreparation{ClonedFromSeed: true}, nil
	}
	// No seed: build an empty work disk. `-E root_owner=0:0` stamps
	// inode 2 (the fs root, which becomes /root inside the guest) as
	// root:root:0755 up front. sshd's StrictModes walks that dir's
	// ownership and mode, so getting it right from mkfs means the
	// authsync step can just write authorized_keys without any
	// repair pass.
	//
	// Unlike the pre-refactor flow there is no "copy /root from the
	// base rootfs" step. The no-seed path is the degraded fallback
	// (the common case has a work-seed artifact and hits the branch
	// above). Dropping the copy eliminates 4 sudo call sites — mount
	// base ro, mount work rw, sudo cp -a, flattenNestedWorkHome —
	// at the cost of losing default distro dotfiles on no-seed VMs.
	// Users who need those should either rebuild the image with a
	// work-seed (the documented path) or land them via [[file_sync]].
	vmCreateStage(ctx, "prepare_work_disk", "creating empty work disk")
	if _, err := s.runner.Run(ctx, "truncate", "-s", strconv.FormatInt(vm.Spec.WorkDiskSizeBytes, 10), vm.Runtime.WorkDiskPath); err != nil {
		return workDiskPreparation{}, err
	}
	if _, err := s.runner.Run(ctx, "mkfs.ext4", "-F", "-E", system.MkfsExtraOptions, vm.Runtime.WorkDiskPath); err != nil {
		return workDiskPreparation{}, err
	}
	return workDiskPreparation{}, nil
}

// sshdGuestConfig is the banger-authored drop-in that lands at
// /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/99-banger.conf inside every guest.
//
// Banger VMs are single-user root sandboxes reachable only through the
// host bridge (default 172.16.0.0/24). The drop-in sets the minimum
// needed to make that usable while keeping the posture tight enough
// that a misconfigured host bridge does not immediately hand over an
// unauthenticated root shell.
//
// Why each line is here:
//
//   - PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
//     The guest IS root — there's no other account. prohibit-password
//     allows pubkey login and blocks password auth at the source even
//     if some future config flips PasswordAuthentication on.
//
//   - PubkeyAuthentication yes
//     The only auth method we expect. Explicit in case a future
//     Debian default or distro package flips it off.
//
//   - PasswordAuthentication no
//
//   - KbdInteractiveAuthentication no
//     Belt-and-braces: every interactive auth path is off, not just
//     the PermitRootLogin path. These are already Debian defaults but
//     stating them here means the drop-in documents the intent.
//
//   - AuthorizedKeysFile /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
//     Pins the lookup path so the banger-written file always wins,
//     regardless of distro default ($HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys) and
//     regardless of any per-image weirdness.
//
//   - PrintMotd no / PrintLastLog no
//     Banger VMs are short-lived sandboxes. The Debian-style MOTD
//     ("Linux ... GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY …") and
//     the "Last login" line are pure noise for `vm run -- echo hi`
//     style invocations. Pair this with the .hushlogin landed on the
//     work disk (see ensureHushLoginOnWorkDisk) so pam_motd also stays
//     silent on distros that read /etc/motd through PAM rather than
//     sshd. The work disk mounts at /root, so the file has to live on
//     that disk — a write to the rootfs overlay would be shadowed.
func sshdGuestConfig() string {
	return strings.Join([]string{
		"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password",
		"PubkeyAuthentication yes",
		"PasswordAuthentication no",
		"KbdInteractiveAuthentication no",
		"AuthorizedKeysFile /root/.ssh/authorized_keys",
		"PrintMotd no",
		"PrintLastLog no",
		"",
	}, "\n")
}
