update: VMs survive banger update and rollback

Three load-bearing fixes that together let `banger update` (and its
auto-rollback path) restart the helper + daemon without killing
every running VM. New smoke scenarios prove the property end-to-end.

Bug fixes:

1. Disable the firecracker SDK's signal-forwarding goroutine. The
   default ForwardSignals = [SIGINT, SIGQUIT, SIGTERM, SIGHUP,
   SIGABRT] installs a handler in the helper that propagates the
   helper's SIGTERM (sent by systemd on `systemctl stop bangerd-
   root.service`) to every running firecracker child. Set
   ForwardSignals to an empty (non-nil) slice so setupSignals
   short-circuits at len()==0.

2. Add SendSIGKILL=no to bangerd-root.service. KillMode=process
   limits the initial SIGTERM to the helper main, but systemd
   still SIGKILLs leftover cgroup processes during the
   FinalKillSignal stage unless SendSIGKILL=no.

3. Route restart-helper / restart-daemon / wait-daemon-ready
   failures through rollbackAndRestart instead of rollbackAndWrap.
   rollbackAndWrap restored .previous binaries but didn't re-
   restart the failed unit, leaving the helper dead with the
   rolled-back binary on disk after a failed update.

Testing infrastructure (production binaries unaffected):

- Hidden --manifest-url and --pubkey-file flags on `banger update`
  let the smoke harness redirect the updater at locally-built
  release artefacts. Marked Hidden in cobra; not advertised in
  --help.
- FetchManifestFrom / VerifyBlobSignatureWithKey /
  FetchAndVerifySignatureWithKey export the existing logic against
  caller-supplied URL / pubkey. The default entry points still
  call them with the embedded canonical values.

Smoke scenarios:

- update_check: --check against fake manifest reports update
  available
- update_to_unknown: --to v9.9.9 fails before any host mutation
- update_no_root: refuses without sudo, install untouched
- update_dry_run: stages + verifies, no swap, version unchanged
- update_keeps_vm_alive: real swap to v0.smoke.0; same VM (same
  boot_id) answers SSH after the daemon restart
- update_rollback_keeps_vm_alive: v0.smoke.broken-bangerd ships a
  bangerd that passes --check-migrations but exits 1 as the
  daemon. The post-swap `systemctl restart bangerd` fails,
  rollbackAndRestart fires, the .previous binaries are restored
  and re-restarted; the same VM still answers SSH afterwards
- daemon_admin (separate prep): covers `banger daemon socket`,
  `bangerd --check-migrations --system`, `sudo banger daemon
  stop`

The smoke release builder generates a fresh ECDSA P-256 keypair
with openssl, signs SHA256SUMS cosign-compatibly, and serves
artefacts from a backgrounded python http.server.
verify_smoke_check_test.go pins the openssl/cosign signature
equivalence so the smoke release builder can't silently drift.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Thales Maciel 2026-05-01 12:08:08 -03:00
parent 7e528f30b3
commit 2606bfbabb
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: 33112E6833C34679
8 changed files with 609 additions and 50 deletions

View file

@ -30,10 +30,12 @@ const stagingTarballName = "release.tar.gz"
func (d *deps) newUpdateCommand() *cobra.Command {
var (
checkOnly bool
dryRun bool
force bool
toVersion string
checkOnly bool
dryRun bool
force bool
toVersion string
manifestURL string
pubkeyFile string
)
cmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "update",
@ -68,10 +70,12 @@ talks to systemd. Run with sudo.
Args: noArgsUsage("usage: banger update [--check] [--dry-run] [--force] [--to vX.Y.Z]"),
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
return d.runUpdate(cmd, runUpdateOpts{
checkOnly: checkOnly,
dryRun: dryRun,
force: force,
toVersion: toVersion,
checkOnly: checkOnly,
dryRun: dryRun,
force: force,
toVersion: toVersion,
manifestURL: manifestURL,
pubkeyFile: pubkeyFile,
})
},
}
@ -79,23 +83,53 @@ talks to systemd. Run with sudo.
cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&dryRun, "dry-run", false, "fetch and verify, but do not swap or restart anything")
cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&force, "force", false, "skip in-flight-op refusal and post-restart doctor verification")
cmd.Flags().StringVar(&toVersion, "to", "", "specific release version to install (default: latest_stable from manifest)")
// Hidden test/dev hooks: redirect the updater at a non-default
// manifest URL and trust a non-default cosign public key. Used by
// the smoke suite to drive a real update against locally-built
// release artefacts. Production users have no reason to touch
// these; they are not advertised in --help.
cmd.Flags().StringVar(&manifestURL, "manifest-url", "", "")
cmd.Flags().StringVar(&pubkeyFile, "pubkey-file", "", "")
_ = cmd.Flags().MarkHidden("manifest-url")
_ = cmd.Flags().MarkHidden("pubkey-file")
return cmd
}
type runUpdateOpts struct {
checkOnly bool
dryRun bool
force bool
toVersion string
checkOnly bool
dryRun bool
force bool
toVersion string
manifestURL string
pubkeyFile string
}
func (d *deps) runUpdate(cmd *cobra.Command, opts runUpdateOpts) error {
ctx := cmd.Context()
out := cmd.OutOrStdout()
// Resolve the test/dev override flags up front so a bad
// --pubkey-file fails fast before any network round-trips.
pubKeyPEM := updater.BangerReleasePublicKey
if strings.TrimSpace(opts.pubkeyFile) != "" {
body, err := os.ReadFile(opts.pubkeyFile)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("read --pubkey-file: %w", err)
}
pubKeyPEM = string(body)
}
// Discover.
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second}
manifest, err := updater.FetchManifest(ctx, client)
var (
manifest updater.Manifest
err error
)
if strings.TrimSpace(opts.manifestURL) != "" {
manifest, err = updater.FetchManifestFrom(ctx, client, opts.manifestURL)
} else {
manifest, err = updater.FetchManifest(ctx, client)
}
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("discover: %w", err)
}
@ -142,7 +176,7 @@ func (d *deps) runUpdate(cmd *cobra.Command, opts runUpdateOpts) error {
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("download: %w", err)
}
if err := updater.FetchAndVerifySignature(ctx, client, target, sumsBody); err != nil {
if err := updater.FetchAndVerifySignatureWithKey(ctx, client, target, sumsBody, pubKeyPEM); err != nil {
// Don't leave the staged tarball around — it failed
// signature verification and shouldn't be re-runnable.
_ = os.Remove(tarballPath)
@ -179,15 +213,21 @@ func (d *deps) runUpdate(cmd *cobra.Command, opts runUpdateOpts) error {
return fmt.Errorf("swap: %w (rolled back)", err)
}
// Restart services + wait for the new daemon.
// Restart services + wait for the new daemon. A `systemctl restart`
// that fails has typically already STOPPED the unit, so the prior
// binary on disk isn't running anywhere — Rollback() must be paired
// with a re-restart to bring the rolled-back binary back into a
// running state. That's rollbackAndRestart's job; rollbackAndWrap
// is for the swap-step failures earlier where the restart never
// fired and the old binary is still in memory.
if err := d.runSystemctl(ctx, "restart", installmeta.DefaultRootHelperService); err != nil {
return rollbackAndWrap(swap, "restart helper", err)
return rollbackAndRestart(ctx, d, swap, "restart helper", err)
}
if err := d.runSystemctl(ctx, "restart", installmeta.DefaultService); err != nil {
return rollbackAndWrap(swap, "restart daemon", err)
return rollbackAndRestart(ctx, d, swap, "restart daemon", err)
}
if err := d.waitForDaemonReady(ctx, socketPath); err != nil {
return rollbackAndWrap(swap, "wait daemon ready", err)
return rollbackAndRestart(ctx, d, swap, "wait daemon ready", err)
}
// Verify with doctor unless --force says otherwise.