docs: fix three security-sensitive doc/code mismatches

A pre-release audit caught three places where the docs misrepresent
the trust model. Each is a claim users would read while auditing
banger and reach the wrong conclusion.

  * docs/privileges.md:140, 194 — bridge default was documented as
    "banger0" but the code default (model.DefaultBridgeName) is
    "br-fc". A user following the manual-removal recipe would `ip
    link del banger0` against a non-existent interface.
  * docs/privileges.md:192 — uninstall recipe said "stop your VMs
    first via `banger vm stop --all`". That flag doesn't exist; vm
    stop is a per-name action. Replaced with the actual options:
    `banger vm prune` (bulk) or per-VM `banger vm stop <name>`.
  * docs/privileges.md:255 and README.md:78-79 — helper unit's
    CapabilityBoundingSet was listed as 5 caps; the actual set in
    commands_system.go:370 is 11 (we added FOWNER/KILL/MKNOD/SETGID/
    SETUID/SYS_CHROOT during Phase B and never updated the docs).
    Updated both lists; the "what's NOT included" rationale stays
    accurate against the new positive list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Thales Maciel 2026-04-28 17:30:58 -03:00
parent 4d8dca6b72
commit 33639efe0c
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GPG key ID: 33112E6833C34679
2 changed files with 11 additions and 8 deletions

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@ -75,8 +75,9 @@ The split matters:
the owner home read-only.
- `bangerd-root.service` is the only process that keeps elevated host
capabilities, and that capability set is limited to the host-kernel
primitives banger actually uses (`CAP_CHOWN`, `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`,
`CAP_NET_ADMIN`).
primitives banger actually uses (`CAP_CHOWN`, `CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE`,
`CAP_FOWNER`, `CAP_KILL`, `CAP_MKNOD`, `CAP_NET_ADMIN`, `CAP_NET_RAW`,
`CAP_SETGID`, `CAP_SETUID`, `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, `CAP_SYS_CHROOT`).
To inspect or refresh the services: