safeJoin previously did textual cleaning + dest-prefix check only. That's enough to catch `../escape`, but not the symlink-ancestor attack: a malicious OCI layer plants `etc -> /tmp/probe`, a later layer writes/deletes/hardlinks against `etc/anything`, and the kernel silently dereferences the symlink so the operation lands at `/tmp/probe/anything` on the host. The daemon runs flatten as the owner UID, so anywhere that UID can write becomes a write target; anywhere it can delete (e.g. its own home) becomes a delete target. Whiteouts and hardlinks make this worse — a whiteout for `etc/.wh.victim` would `RemoveAll` the host file `/tmp/probe/victim`, and a TypeLink would expose host files inside the extracted rootfs. safeJoin now Lstat-walks every intermediate component of the joined path against the already-extracted tree, refusing if any ancestor is a symlink. Walking is race-free against the extraction loop because we process tar entries serially. Leaf components stay caller-owned (TypeSymlink writes legitimately want a symlink leaf; TypeReg RemoveAll's any prior leaf before opening; etc.). Three new tests pin the protection: write through a symlinked ancestor, whiteout through a symlinked ancestor, and hardlink target through a symlinked ancestor — each must fail and leave the host probe path untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
592 lines
18 KiB
Go
592 lines
18 KiB
Go
package imagepull
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import (
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"archive/tar"
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"errors"
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"io"
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"log"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"net/url"
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"os"
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"os/exec"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"banger/internal/system"
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"github.com/google/go-containerregistry/pkg/name"
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"github.com/google/go-containerregistry/pkg/registry"
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v1 "github.com/google/go-containerregistry/pkg/v1"
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"github.com/google/go-containerregistry/pkg/v1/empty"
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"github.com/google/go-containerregistry/pkg/v1/mutate"
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"github.com/google/go-containerregistry/pkg/v1/remote"
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"github.com/google/go-containerregistry/pkg/v1/tarball"
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)
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// ensure log import stays used even when registry-logging is silenced.
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var _ = log.New
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// tarMember is a single entry to put into a fake layer tarball.
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type tarMember struct {
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name string
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mode int64
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body []byte
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link string // for symlinks / hardlinks
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dir bool
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symlink bool
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hardlink bool
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}
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func buildTar(t *testing.T, members []tarMember) []byte {
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t.Helper()
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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tw := tar.NewWriter(&buf)
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for _, m := range members {
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hdr := &tar.Header{Name: m.name, Mode: m.mode}
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switch {
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case m.dir:
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hdr.Typeflag = tar.TypeDir
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if hdr.Mode == 0 {
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hdr.Mode = 0o755
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}
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case m.symlink:
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hdr.Typeflag = tar.TypeSymlink
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hdr.Linkname = m.link
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case m.hardlink:
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hdr.Typeflag = tar.TypeLink
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hdr.Linkname = m.link
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default:
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hdr.Typeflag = tar.TypeReg
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hdr.Size = int64(len(m.body))
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if hdr.Mode == 0 {
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hdr.Mode = 0o644
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}
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}
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if err := tw.WriteHeader(hdr); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("tar header: %v", err)
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}
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if hdr.Typeflag == tar.TypeReg && len(m.body) > 0 {
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if _, err := tw.Write(m.body); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("tar write: %v", err)
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}
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}
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}
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if err := tw.Close(); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("tar close: %v", err)
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}
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return buf.Bytes()
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}
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func startRegistry(t *testing.T) string {
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t.Helper()
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srv := httptest.NewServer(registry.New(registry.Logger(log.New(io.Discard, "", 0))))
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t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
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u, err := url.Parse(srv.URL)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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return u.Host
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}
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func makeLayer(t *testing.T, members []tarMember) v1.Layer {
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t.Helper()
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body := buildTar(t, members)
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layer, err := tarball.LayerFromOpener(func() (io.ReadCloser, error) {
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return io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(body)), nil
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("LayerFromOpener: %v", err)
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}
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return layer
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}
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// pushImage assembles a multi-layer image with linux/amd64 platform and
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// pushes it under repo:tag. Returns the canonical reference.
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func pushImage(t *testing.T, host, repo, tag string, layers ...v1.Layer) string {
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t.Helper()
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img, err := mutate.AppendLayers(empty.Image, layers...)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("AppendLayers: %v", err)
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}
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cfg, err := img.ConfigFile()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ConfigFile: %v", err)
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}
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cfg.Architecture = "amd64"
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cfg.OS = "linux"
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img, err = mutate.ConfigFile(img, cfg)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ConfigFile mutate: %v", err)
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}
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ref, err := name.NewTag(host + "/" + repo + ":" + tag)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("NewTag: %v", err)
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}
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if err := remote.Write(ref, img); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("remote.Write: %v", err)
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}
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return ref.String()
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}
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func TestPullResolvesImageAndFlattenPopulatesCache(t *testing.T) {
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host := startRegistry(t)
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ref := pushImage(t, host, "banger/test", "v1",
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makeLayer(t, []tarMember{
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{name: "etc/", dir: true},
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{name: "etc/hello", body: []byte("world")},
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}),
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)
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cacheDir := t.TempDir()
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pulled, err := Pull(context.Background(), ref, cacheDir)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Pull: %v", err)
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}
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if pulled.Digest == "" {
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t.Fatalf("Digest empty")
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}
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if pulled.Platform != "linux/amd64" {
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t.Fatalf("Platform = %q", pulled.Platform)
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}
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// Pull itself does NOT populate the cache — it defers to Flatten
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// (which drains the layer streams). This is load-bearing: eagerly
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// opening+closing layer readers in Pull leaves zero-byte blobs that
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// poison subsequent pulls of the same digest.
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dest := t.TempDir()
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if _, err := Flatten(context.Background(), pulled, dest); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Flatten: %v", err)
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}
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// Cache now holds at least one non-empty blob.
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blobsRoot := filepath.Join(cacheDir, "blobs")
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nonEmpty := 0
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_ = filepath.WalkDir(blobsRoot, func(p string, d os.DirEntry, _ error) error {
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if d == nil || d.IsDir() {
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return nil
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}
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info, err := d.Info()
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if err == nil && info.Size() > 0 {
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nonEmpty++
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}
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return nil
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})
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if nonEmpty == 0 {
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t.Fatalf("no non-empty blobs cached under %s after Flatten", blobsRoot)
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}
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}
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func TestFlattenAppliesLayersAndWhiteouts(t *testing.T) {
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host := startRegistry(t)
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ref := pushImage(t, host, "banger/test", "wh",
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makeLayer(t, []tarMember{
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{name: "etc/", dir: true},
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{name: "etc/keep", body: []byte("keep")},
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{name: "etc/old", body: []byte("old")},
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}),
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makeLayer(t, []tarMember{
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{name: "etc/.wh.old"}, // delete etc/old
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{name: "etc/new", body: []byte("new")}, // add etc/new
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{name: "var/", dir: true},
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{name: "var/log/", dir: true},
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{name: "var/log/file", body: []byte("log")},
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}),
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makeLayer(t, []tarMember{
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{name: "var/log/.wh..wh..opq"}, // wipe var/log contents from prior layers
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{name: "var/log/fresh", body: []byte("fresh")},
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}),
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)
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pulled, err := Pull(context.Background(), ref, t.TempDir())
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Pull: %v", err)
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}
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dest := t.TempDir()
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if _, err := Flatten(context.Background(), pulled, dest); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Flatten: %v", err)
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}
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checkFile := func(rel, want string) {
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t.Helper()
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data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dest, rel))
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if err != nil {
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t.Errorf("read %s: %v", rel, err)
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return
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}
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if string(data) != want {
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t.Errorf("%s = %q, want %q", rel, string(data), want)
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}
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}
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checkFile("etc/keep", "keep")
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checkFile("etc/new", "new")
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checkFile("var/log/fresh", "fresh")
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if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dest, "etc/old")); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
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t.Errorf("etc/old should have been whited out: stat err=%v", err)
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}
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if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dest, "var/log/file")); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
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t.Errorf("var/log/file should have been wiped by opaque marker: stat err=%v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestFlattenRejectsPathTraversal(t *testing.T) {
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host := startRegistry(t)
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ref := pushImage(t, host, "banger/test", "evil",
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makeLayer(t, []tarMember{
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{name: "../escape", body: []byte("bad")},
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}),
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)
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pulled, err := Pull(context.Background(), ref, t.TempDir())
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Pull: %v", err)
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}
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dest := t.TempDir()
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_, err = Flatten(context.Background(), pulled, dest)
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if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "unsafe path") {
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t.Fatalf("Flatten escape: err=%v, want unsafe path", err)
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}
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escape := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(dest), "escape")
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if _, statErr := os.Stat(escape); !errors.Is(statErr, os.ErrNotExist) {
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t.Errorf("escape file should not exist: %v", statErr)
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}
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}
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func TestFlattenRejectsDebugFSHostilePath(t *testing.T) {
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img, err := mutate.AppendLayers(empty.Image,
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makeLayer(t, []tarMember{
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{name: `etc/bad"name`, body: []byte("bad")},
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}),
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)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("AppendLayers: %v", err)
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}
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pulled := PulledImage{
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Reference: "test/debugfs-hostile",
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Digest: "sha256:test",
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Platform: "linux/amd64",
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Image: img,
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}
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_, err = Flatten(context.Background(), pulled, t.TempDir())
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if !errors.Is(err, errUnsafeDebugFSPath) {
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t.Fatalf("Flatten hostile path: err=%v, want %v", err, errUnsafeDebugFSPath)
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}
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if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), `etc/bad\"name`) {
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t.Fatalf("Flatten hostile path: err=%v, want offending path", err)
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}
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}
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func TestFlattenAcceptsAbsoluteSymlink(t *testing.T) {
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// Container layers regularly contain absolute symlinks like
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// /usr/bin/mawk — they're interpreted relative to the rootfs at
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// boot time, not against the host filesystem. They must extract
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// cleanly.
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host := startRegistry(t)
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ref := pushImage(t, host, "banger/test", "abs-sym",
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makeLayer(t, []tarMember{
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{name: "etc/alternatives/awk", symlink: true, link: "/usr/bin/mawk"},
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}),
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)
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pulled, err := Pull(context.Background(), ref, t.TempDir())
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Pull: %v", err)
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}
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dest := t.TempDir()
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if _, err := Flatten(context.Background(), pulled, dest); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Flatten: %v", err)
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}
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link := filepath.Join(dest, "etc/alternatives/awk")
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target, err := os.Readlink(link)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("readlink: %v", err)
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}
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if target != "/usr/bin/mawk" {
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t.Errorf("link target = %q, want /usr/bin/mawk", target)
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}
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}
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func TestFlattenRejectsRelativeSymlinkEscape(t *testing.T) {
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// Relative symlinks with .. must still be rejected: the resolved
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// path can escape dest at the host level even if the in-VM
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// resolution would be safe.
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host := startRegistry(t)
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ref := pushImage(t, host, "banger/test", "rel-escape",
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makeLayer(t, []tarMember{
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{name: "etc/evil", symlink: true, link: "../../../../etc/passwd"},
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}),
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)
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pulled, err := Pull(context.Background(), ref, t.TempDir())
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Pull: %v", err)
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}
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_, err = Flatten(context.Background(), pulled, t.TempDir())
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if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "unsafe symlink") {
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t.Fatalf("Flatten relative escape: err=%v", err)
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}
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}
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// TestFlattenRejectsWriteThroughSymlinkAncestor exercises the OCI
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// extraction-escape attack: layer 1 plants `etc -> /tmp` (a directory
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// the daemon can write to), layer 2 writes `etc/probe`. Without the
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// ancestor walk in safeJoin the write would land at /tmp/probe on the
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// host. With it, the second layer's write is refused.
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func TestFlattenRejectsWriteThroughSymlinkAncestor(t *testing.T) {
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host := startRegistry(t)
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probeDir := t.TempDir() // a path the daemon user can write to
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ref := pushImage(t, host, "banger/test", "sym-ancestor",
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makeLayer(t, []tarMember{
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{name: "etc", symlink: true, link: probeDir},
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}),
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makeLayer(t, []tarMember{
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{name: "etc/probe", body: []byte("escaped")},
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}),
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)
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pulled, err := Pull(context.Background(), ref, t.TempDir())
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Pull: %v", err)
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}
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dest := t.TempDir()
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_, err = Flatten(context.Background(), pulled, dest)
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if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "symlink") {
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t.Fatalf("Flatten: err=%v, want symlink-ancestor rejection", err)
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}
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// The escape file must NOT have been written outside dest.
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if _, statErr := os.Stat(filepath.Join(probeDir, "probe")); !errors.Is(statErr, os.ErrNotExist) {
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t.Fatalf("escape file at %s should not exist; got %v", filepath.Join(probeDir, "probe"), statErr)
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}
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}
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// TestFlattenRejectsWhiteoutThroughSymlinkAncestor pins the same
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// guarantee for the whiteout path: a symlinked ancestor must not let
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// the extractor RemoveAll on a host file outside dest.
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func TestFlattenRejectsWhiteoutThroughSymlinkAncestor(t *testing.T) {
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host := startRegistry(t)
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probeDir := t.TempDir()
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probeFile := filepath.Join(probeDir, "victim")
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if err := os.WriteFile(probeFile, []byte("preserved"), 0o644); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("write probe: %v", err)
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}
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ref := pushImage(t, host, "banger/test", "wh-sym-ancestor",
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makeLayer(t, []tarMember{
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{name: "etc", symlink: true, link: probeDir},
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}),
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makeLayer(t, []tarMember{
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{name: "etc/.wh.victim"},
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}),
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)
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pulled, err := Pull(context.Background(), ref, t.TempDir())
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Pull: %v", err)
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}
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dest := t.TempDir()
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_, err = Flatten(context.Background(), pulled, dest)
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if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "symlink") {
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t.Fatalf("Flatten: err=%v, want symlink-ancestor rejection on whiteout", err)
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}
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if _, statErr := os.Stat(probeFile); statErr != nil {
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t.Fatalf("probe file %s removed via whiteout escape: %v", probeFile, statErr)
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}
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}
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// TestFlattenRejectsHardlinkTargetThroughSymlinkAncestor covers the
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// hardlink-target validator: a symlinked ancestor on the link source
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// must not let `os.Link` resolve through it and hard-link a host file
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// (e.g. /etc/passwd) into the extraction tree.
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func TestFlattenRejectsHardlinkTargetThroughSymlinkAncestor(t *testing.T) {
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host := startRegistry(t)
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probeDir := t.TempDir()
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probeFile := filepath.Join(probeDir, "secret")
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if err := os.WriteFile(probeFile, []byte("hands off"), 0o644); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("write probe: %v", err)
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}
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ref := pushImage(t, host, "banger/test", "ln-sym-ancestor",
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makeLayer(t, []tarMember{
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{name: "etc", symlink: true, link: probeDir},
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}),
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makeLayer(t, []tarMember{
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{name: "leaked", hardlink: true, link: "etc/secret"},
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}),
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)
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pulled, err := Pull(context.Background(), ref, t.TempDir())
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Pull: %v", err)
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}
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dest := t.TempDir()
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_, err = Flatten(context.Background(), pulled, dest)
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if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "symlink") {
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t.Fatalf("Flatten: err=%v, want symlink-ancestor rejection on hardlink target", err)
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}
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// dest must not contain a hardlink to the host secret.
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if _, statErr := os.Lstat(filepath.Join(dest, "leaked")); !errors.Is(statErr, os.ErrNotExist) {
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t.Fatalf("hardlink leaked file should not exist in dest; got %v", statErr)
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}
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}
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func TestFlattenTarRejectsDebugFSHostilePath(t *testing.T) {
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tarData := buildTar(t, []tarMember{
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{name: "etc/bad\tname", body: []byte("bad")},
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})
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_, err := FlattenTar(context.Background(), bytes.NewReader(tarData), t.TempDir())
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if !errors.Is(err, errUnsafeDebugFSPath) {
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t.Fatalf("FlattenTar hostile path: err=%v, want %v", err, errUnsafeDebugFSPath)
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}
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if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), `etc/bad\tname`) {
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t.Fatalf("FlattenTar hostile path: err=%v, want offending path", err)
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}
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}
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func TestBuildExt4ProducesValidImage(t *testing.T) {
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if _, err := exec.LookPath("mkfs.ext4"); err != nil {
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t.Skip("mkfs.ext4 not available; skipping")
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}
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src := t.TempDir()
|
|
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(src, "etc"), 0o755); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatal(err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(src, "etc", "hello"), []byte("hi"), 0o644); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatal(err)
|
|
}
|
|
out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "rootfs.ext4")
|
|
if err := BuildExt4(context.Background(), system.NewRunner(), src, out, MinExt4Size); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("BuildExt4: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
info, err := os.Stat(out)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("stat output: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if info.Size() != MinExt4Size {
|
|
t.Errorf("ext4 size = %d, want %d", info.Size(), MinExt4Size)
|
|
}
|
|
// Quick sanity via file(1) — the ext4 superblock should be detectable.
|
|
if _, err := exec.LookPath("file"); err == nil {
|
|
out, _ := exec.Command("file", "-b", out).Output()
|
|
if !bytes.Contains(out, []byte("ext")) {
|
|
t.Errorf("file(1) does not see an ext filesystem: %s", out)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestFlattenCapturesHeaderMetadata(t *testing.T) {
|
|
host := startRegistry(t)
|
|
ref := pushImage(t, host, "banger/test", "meta",
|
|
makeLayer(t, []tarMember{
|
|
{name: "usr/bin/sudo", mode: 0o4755, body: []byte("setuid-bin")},
|
|
{name: "etc/", dir: true, mode: 0o755},
|
|
{name: "etc/link", symlink: true, link: "/usr/bin/sudo"},
|
|
}),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
pulled, err := Pull(context.Background(), ref, t.TempDir())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Pull: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
meta, err := Flatten(context.Background(), pulled, t.TempDir())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Flatten: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sudo, ok := meta.Entries["usr/bin/sudo"]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
t.Fatalf("missing usr/bin/sudo entry: %+v", meta.Entries)
|
|
}
|
|
if sudo.Mode&0o4000 == 0 {
|
|
t.Errorf("setuid bit lost: mode=0%o", sudo.Mode)
|
|
}
|
|
if sudo.Mode&0o777 != 0o755 {
|
|
t.Errorf("perm bits = 0%o, want 0o755", sudo.Mode&0o777)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if _, ok := meta.Entries["etc"]; !ok {
|
|
t.Errorf("missing etc dir entry")
|
|
}
|
|
if _, ok := meta.Entries["etc/link"]; !ok {
|
|
t.Errorf("missing symlink entry")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestApplyOwnershipRewritesUidGidMode(t *testing.T) {
|
|
if _, err := exec.LookPath("mkfs.ext4"); err != nil {
|
|
t.Skip("mkfs.ext4 not available; skipping")
|
|
}
|
|
if _, err := exec.LookPath("debugfs"); err != nil {
|
|
t.Skip("debugfs not available; skipping")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Stage a tiny source tree and build an ext4 with mkfs.ext4 -d.
|
|
src := t.TempDir()
|
|
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(src, "setuid-bin"), []byte("x"), 0o644); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatal(err)
|
|
}
|
|
out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "rootfs.ext4")
|
|
if err := BuildExt4(context.Background(), system.NewRunner(), src, out, MinExt4Size); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("BuildExt4: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Apply synthetic metadata: set uid=0 gid=0 mode=0o4755 on setuid-bin.
|
|
meta := Metadata{Entries: map[string]FileMeta{
|
|
"setuid-bin": {Uid: 0, Gid: 0, Mode: 0o4755, Type: tar.TypeReg},
|
|
}}
|
|
if err := ApplyOwnership(context.Background(), system.NewRunner(), out, meta); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ApplyOwnership: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Read back the inode via debugfs.
|
|
statOut, err := exec.Command("debugfs", "-R", "stat /setuid-bin", out).CombinedOutput()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("debugfs stat: %v: %s", err, statOut)
|
|
}
|
|
s := string(statOut)
|
|
if !bytes.Contains([]byte(s), []byte("User: 0")) && !bytes.Contains([]byte(s), []byte("User: 0")) {
|
|
t.Errorf("uid not 0 after fixup. output:\n%s", s)
|
|
}
|
|
if !bytes.Contains([]byte(s), []byte("Mode: 04755")) && !bytes.Contains([]byte(s), []byte("Mode: 4755")) {
|
|
t.Errorf("setuid mode not applied. output:\n%s", s)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestApplyOwnershipRejectsUnsafeMetadataPath(t *testing.T) {
|
|
meta := Metadata{Entries: map[string]FileMeta{
|
|
"bad\nname": {Uid: 0, Gid: 0, Mode: 0o644, Type: tar.TypeReg},
|
|
}}
|
|
err := ApplyOwnership(context.Background(), system.NewRunner(), filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "rootfs.ext4"), meta)
|
|
if !errors.Is(err, errUnsafeDebugFSPath) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ApplyOwnership hostile path: err=%v, want %v", err, errUnsafeDebugFSPath)
|
|
}
|
|
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), `bad\nname`) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ApplyOwnership hostile path: err=%v, want offending path", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestBuildOwnershipScriptDeterministic(t *testing.T) {
|
|
meta := Metadata{Entries: map[string]FileMeta{
|
|
"b": {Uid: 0, Gid: 0, Mode: 0o755, Type: tar.TypeReg},
|
|
"a": {Uid: 0, Gid: 0, Mode: 0o755, Type: tar.TypeReg},
|
|
"a/x": {Uid: 0, Gid: 0, Mode: 0o644, Type: tar.TypeReg},
|
|
}}
|
|
gotBuf, err := buildOwnershipScript(meta)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("buildOwnershipScript: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
got := gotBuf.String()
|
|
// sorted: a, a/x, b
|
|
want := "set_inode_field /a uid 0\nset_inode_field /a gid 0\nset_inode_field /a mode 0100755\n" +
|
|
"set_inode_field /a/x uid 0\nset_inode_field /a/x gid 0\nset_inode_field /a/x mode 0100644\n" +
|
|
"set_inode_field /b uid 0\nset_inode_field /b gid 0\nset_inode_field /b mode 0100755\n"
|
|
if got != want {
|
|
t.Errorf("script mismatch\ngot:\n%s\nwant:\n%s", got, want)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestBuildExt4RejectsTinySize(t *testing.T) {
|
|
src := t.TempDir()
|
|
out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "rootfs.ext4")
|
|
err := BuildExt4(context.Background(), system.NewRunner(), src, out, 1024)
|
|
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "below minimum") {
|
|
t.Fatalf("BuildExt4 tiny: err=%v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if _, statErr := os.Stat(out); !errors.Is(statErr, os.ErrNotExist) {
|
|
t.Errorf("output file should not exist on rejection: %v", statErr)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|