banger/internal/daemon/vm_disk.go
Thales Maciel 59e48e830b
daemon: split owner daemon from root helper
Move the supported systemd path to two services: an owner-user bangerd for
orchestration and a narrow root helper for bridge/tap, NAT/resolver, dm/loop,
and Firecracker ownership. This removes repeated sudo from daily vm and image
flows without leaving the general daemon running as root.

Add install metadata, system install/status/restart/uninstall commands, and a
system-owned runtime layout. Keep user SSH/config material in the owner home,
lock file_sync to the owner home, and move daemon known_hosts handling out of
the old root-owned control path.

Route privileged lifecycle steps through typed privilegedOps calls, harden the
two systemd units, and rewrite smoke plus docs around the supported service
model.

Verified with make build, make test, make lint, and make smoke on the
supported systemd host path.
2026-04-26 12:43:17 -03:00

179 lines
6.8 KiB
Go

package daemon
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"banger/internal/guestconfig"
"banger/internal/guestnet"
"banger/internal/model"
"banger/internal/roothelper"
"banger/internal/system"
)
type workDiskPreparation struct {
ClonedFromSeed bool
}
func (s *VMService) ensureSystemOverlay(ctx context.Context, vm *model.VMRecord) error {
if exists(vm.Runtime.SystemOverlay) {
return nil
}
_, err := s.runner.Run(ctx, "truncate", "-s", strconv.FormatInt(vm.Spec.SystemOverlaySizeByte, 10), vm.Runtime.SystemOverlay)
return err
}
// patchRootOverlay writes the per-VM config files (resolv.conf,
// hostname, hosts, sshd drop-in, network bootstrap, fstab) into the
// rootfs overlay. The start flow passes the DM device path explicitly so the
// owner daemon can hand the privileged ext4 work to the root helper without
// rereading mutable process state.
func (s *VMService) patchRootOverlay(ctx context.Context, vm model.VMRecord, image model.Image, dmDev string) error {
if strings.TrimSpace(dmDev) == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("vm %q: DM device is required", vm.ID)
}
resolv := []byte(fmt.Sprintf("nameserver %s\n", s.config.DefaultDNS))
hostname := []byte(vm.Name + "\n")
hosts := []byte(fmt.Sprintf("127.0.0.1 localhost\n127.0.1.1 %s\n", vm.Name))
sshdConfig := []byte(sshdGuestConfig())
fstabBytes, err := s.privOps().ReadExt4File(ctx, dmDev, "/etc/fstab")
fstab := string(fstabBytes)
if err != nil {
fstab = ""
}
builder := guestconfig.NewBuilder()
builder.WriteFile("/etc/resolv.conf", resolv)
builder.WriteFile("/etc/hostname", hostname)
builder.WriteFile("/etc/hosts", hosts)
builder.WriteFile(guestnet.ConfigPath, guestnet.ConfigFile(vm.Runtime.GuestIP, s.config.BridgeIP, s.config.DefaultDNS))
builder.WriteFile(guestnet.GuestScriptPath, []byte(guestnet.BootstrapScript()))
builder.WriteFile("/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/99-banger.conf", sshdConfig)
builder.DropMountTarget("/home")
builder.DropMountTarget("/var")
builder.AddMount(guestconfig.MountSpec{
Source: "tmpfs",
Target: "/run",
FSType: "tmpfs",
Options: []string{"defaults", "nodev", "nosuid", "mode=0755"},
Dump: 0,
Pass: 0,
})
builder.AddMount(guestconfig.MountSpec{
Source: "tmpfs",
Target: "/tmp",
FSType: "tmpfs",
Options: []string{"defaults", "nodev", "nosuid", "mode=1777"},
Dump: 0,
Pass: 0,
})
s.capHooks.contributeGuest(builder, vm, image)
builder.WriteFile("/etc/fstab", []byte(builder.RenderFSTab(fstab)))
files := builder.Files()
writes := make([]roothelper.Ext4Write, 0, len(files))
for _, guestPath := range builder.FilePaths() {
mode := uint32(0o644)
if guestPath == guestnet.GuestScriptPath {
mode = 0o755
}
writes = append(writes, roothelper.Ext4Write{
GuestPath: guestPath,
Data: files[guestPath],
Mode: mode,
})
}
return s.privOps().WriteExt4Files(ctx, dmDev, writes)
}
func (s *VMService) ensureWorkDisk(ctx context.Context, vm *model.VMRecord, image model.Image) (workDiskPreparation, error) {
if exists(vm.Runtime.WorkDiskPath) {
return workDiskPreparation{}, nil
}
if exists(image.WorkSeedPath) {
vmCreateStage(ctx, "prepare_work_disk", "cloning work seed")
if err := system.CopyFilePreferClone(image.WorkSeedPath, vm.Runtime.WorkDiskPath); err != nil {
return workDiskPreparation{}, err
}
seedInfo, err := os.Stat(image.WorkSeedPath)
if err != nil {
return workDiskPreparation{}, err
}
if vm.Spec.WorkDiskSizeBytes < seedInfo.Size() {
return workDiskPreparation{}, fmt.Errorf("requested work disk size %d is smaller than seed image %d", vm.Spec.WorkDiskSizeBytes, seedInfo.Size())
}
if vm.Spec.WorkDiskSizeBytes > seedInfo.Size() {
vmCreateStage(ctx, "prepare_work_disk", "resizing work disk")
if err := system.ResizeExt4Image(ctx, s.runner, vm.Runtime.WorkDiskPath, vm.Spec.WorkDiskSizeBytes); err != nil {
return workDiskPreparation{}, err
}
}
return workDiskPreparation{ClonedFromSeed: true}, nil
}
// No seed: build an empty work disk. `-E root_owner=0:0` stamps
// inode 2 (the fs root, which becomes /root inside the guest) as
// root:root:0755 up front. sshd's StrictModes walks that dir's
// ownership and mode, so getting it right from mkfs means the
// authsync step can just write authorized_keys without any
// repair pass.
//
// Unlike the pre-refactor flow there is no "copy /root from the
// base rootfs" step. The no-seed path is the degraded fallback
// (the common case has a work-seed artifact and hits the branch
// above). Dropping the copy eliminates 4 sudo call sites — mount
// base ro, mount work rw, sudo cp -a, flattenNestedWorkHome —
// at the cost of losing default distro dotfiles on no-seed VMs.
// Users who need those should either rebuild the image with a
// work-seed (the documented path) or land them via [[file_sync]].
vmCreateStage(ctx, "prepare_work_disk", "creating empty work disk")
if _, err := s.runner.Run(ctx, "truncate", "-s", strconv.FormatInt(vm.Spec.WorkDiskSizeBytes, 10), vm.Runtime.WorkDiskPath); err != nil {
return workDiskPreparation{}, err
}
if _, err := s.runner.Run(ctx, "mkfs.ext4", "-F", "-E", "root_owner=0:0", vm.Runtime.WorkDiskPath); err != nil {
return workDiskPreparation{}, err
}
return workDiskPreparation{}, nil
}
// sshdGuestConfig is the banger-authored drop-in that lands at
// /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/99-banger.conf inside every guest.
//
// Banger VMs are single-user root sandboxes reachable only through the
// host bridge (default 172.16.0.0/24). The drop-in sets the minimum
// needed to make that usable while keeping the posture tight enough
// that a misconfigured host bridge does not immediately hand over an
// unauthenticated root shell.
//
// Why each line is here:
//
// - PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
// The guest IS root — there's no other account. prohibit-password
// allows pubkey login and blocks password auth at the source even
// if some future config flips PasswordAuthentication on.
//
// - PubkeyAuthentication yes
// The only auth method we expect. Explicit in case a future
// Debian default or distro package flips it off.
//
// - PasswordAuthentication no
//
// - KbdInteractiveAuthentication no
// Belt-and-braces: every interactive auth path is off, not just
// the PermitRootLogin path. These are already Debian defaults but
// stating them here means the drop-in documents the intent.
//
// - AuthorizedKeysFile /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
// Pins the lookup path so the banger-written file always wins,
// regardless of distro default ($HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys) and
// regardless of any per-image weirdness.
func sshdGuestConfig() string {
return strings.Join([]string{
"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password",
"PubkeyAuthentication yes",
"PasswordAuthentication no",
"KbdInteractiveAuthentication no",
"AuthorizedKeysFile /root/.ssh/authorized_keys",
"",
}, "\n")
}