banger/internal/daemon/vm_authsync.go
Thales Maciel 6ab1a2b844
daemon: rewrite git identity sync + file_sync on ext4 toolkit
ensureGitIdentityOnWorkDisk, writeGitIdentity, runFileSync, and
copyHostDir all dropped their mount + sudo install/mkdir/chmod/chown
scaffolding. Every write now goes through MkdirExt4,
WriteExt4FileOwned, ReadExt4File, and the new MkdirAllExt4 helper —
all sudoless against user-owned ext4 images.

Net effect with the prior two commits: ensureWorkDisk, authsync, image
seeding, git identity sync, and file_sync no longer mount the work
disk or spawn sudo mkdir/chmod/chown/cat/install. Only the
image-build path (which legitimately produces root-owned artifacts)
still touches MountTempDir.

The filesystemRunner test harness grew a small debugfs/e2cp/e2rm
emulator so the WorkspaceService tests keep exercising their real
code paths without a live ext4 image. The mock is deliberately
dumb — it only implements the subset runFileSync and writeGitIdentity
drive.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-23 18:29:30 -03:00

411 lines
13 KiB
Go

package daemon
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"os"
"path"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
"banger/internal/guest"
"banger/internal/model"
"banger/internal/system"
)
const (
workDiskGitConfigRelativePath = ".gitconfig"
hostGlobalGitIdentitySource = "git config --global"
)
type gitIdentity struct {
Name string
Email string
}
func (s *WorkspaceService) ensureAuthorizedKeyOnWorkDisk(ctx context.Context, vm *model.VMRecord, image model.Image, prep workDiskPreparation) error {
fingerprint, err := guest.AuthorizedPublicKeyFingerprint(s.config.SSHKeyPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("derive authorized ssh key fingerprint: %w", err)
}
if prep.ClonedFromSeed && image.SeededSSHPublicKeyFingerprint != "" && image.SeededSSHPublicKeyFingerprint == fingerprint {
vmCreateStage(ctx, "prepare_work_disk", "using seeded SSH access")
return nil
}
publicKey, err := guest.AuthorizedPublicKey(s.config.SSHKeyPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("derive authorized ssh key: %w", err)
}
vmCreateStage(ctx, "prepare_work_disk", "provisioning SSH access on work disk")
workDisk := vm.Runtime.WorkDiskPath
if err := provisionAuthorizedKey(ctx, s.runner, workDisk, publicKey); err != nil {
return err
}
if prep.ClonedFromSeed && image.Managed {
vmCreateStage(ctx, "prepare_work_disk", "refreshing managed work seed")
if err := s.imageWorkSeed(ctx, image, fingerprint); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// provisionAuthorizedKey writes the managed SSH key into
// /.ssh/authorized_keys on an ext4 image via the sudoless toolkit.
// Shared between work-disk and image-seed paths — both need the same
// sequence: normalise fs-root perms, create /.ssh, merge against any
// existing authorized_keys, rewrite with root:root:0600.
//
// The fs root doubles as /root inside the guest, which sshd walks
// under StrictModes; forcing 0755 root:root here keeps a drifted
// seed image from silently rejecting the key at login time.
func provisionAuthorizedKey(ctx context.Context, runner system.CommandRunner, imagePath string, publicKey []byte) error {
if err := system.EnsureExt4RootPerms(ctx, runner, imagePath, 0o755, 0, 0); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := system.MkdirExt4(ctx, runner, imagePath, "/.ssh", 0o700, 0, 0); err != nil {
return err
}
var existing []byte
exists, err := system.Ext4PathExists(ctx, runner, imagePath, "/.ssh/authorized_keys")
if err != nil {
return err
}
if exists {
existing, err = system.ReadExt4File(ctx, runner, imagePath, "/.ssh/authorized_keys")
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
merged := mergeAuthorizedKey(existing, publicKey)
return system.WriteExt4FileOwned(ctx, runner, imagePath, "/.ssh/authorized_keys", 0o600, 0, 0, merged)
}
// normaliseHomeDirPerms forces the home-directory mount point to
// 0755 root:root. sshd's StrictModes (the default, re-enabled after
// banger stopped shipping "StrictModes no") rejects authorized_keys
// if the user's HOME — here the work-disk filesystem root — is
// group/other-writable or owned by anyone other than root. mkfs.ext4
// normally creates an ext4 root dir at 0755 root:root, but older
// work-seed images may have drifted, and `cp -a` on a non-standard
// source can carry weird bits forward. Forcing a known-good state
// here is cheap insurance.
func normaliseHomeDirPerms(ctx context.Context, runner system.CommandRunner, workMount string) error {
if _, err := runner.RunSudo(ctx, "chown", "0:0", workMount); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := runner.RunSudo(ctx, "chmod", "0755", workMount); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (s *WorkspaceService) ensureGitIdentityOnWorkDisk(ctx context.Context, vm *model.VMRecord) error {
runner := s.runner
if runner == nil {
runner = system.NewRunner()
}
identity, err := resolveHostGlobalGitIdentity(ctx, runner)
if err != nil {
s.warnGitIdentitySyncSkipped(*vm, hostGlobalGitIdentitySource, err)
return nil
}
vmCreateStage(ctx, "prepare_work_disk", "syncing git identity")
return writeGitIdentity(ctx, runner, vm.Runtime.WorkDiskPath, "/"+workDiskGitConfigRelativePath, identity)
}
// runFileSync applies every [[file_sync]] entry from the daemon config
// to the VM's work disk. Missing host paths are skipped with a warn.
// Other errors abort the VM create (since the user explicitly asked
// for the sync).
//
// Operates directly on the ext4 image via the sudoless toolkit — no
// mount, no privileged install(1). Every write lands as root:root;
// file modes come from the [[file_sync]] entry (default 0600),
// directory modes from the source on the host.
func (s *WorkspaceService) runFileSync(ctx context.Context, vm *model.VMRecord) error {
if len(s.config.FileSync) == 0 {
return nil
}
runner := s.runner
if runner == nil {
runner = system.NewRunner()
}
hostHome, err := os.UserHomeDir()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("resolve host user home: %w", err)
}
workDisk := vm.Runtime.WorkDiskPath
for _, entry := range s.config.FileSync {
hostPath := expandHostPath(entry.Host, hostHome)
guestRel := guestPathRelativeToRoot(entry.Guest)
guestImagePath := "/" + guestRel
info, err := os.Stat(hostPath)
if err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
s.warnFileSyncSkipped(*vm, hostPath, err)
continue
}
return fmt.Errorf("file_sync: stat %s: %w", hostPath, err)
}
vmCreateStage(ctx, "prepare_work_disk", "file sync: "+entry.Host+" → "+entry.Guest)
parent := path.Dir(guestImagePath)
if parent != "/" && parent != "." {
if err := system.MkdirAllExt4(ctx, runner, workDisk, parent, 0o755, 0, 0); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("file_sync: mkdir %s: %w", parent, err)
}
}
if info.IsDir() {
if err := s.copyHostDir(ctx, *vm, runner, workDisk, hostPath, guestImagePath); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("file_sync: copy directory %s → %s: %w", hostPath, guestImagePath, err)
}
continue
}
mode, err := parseFileSyncMode(entry.Mode)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("file_sync: %s: %w", entry.Host, err)
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(hostPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("file_sync: read %s: %w", hostPath, err)
}
if err := system.WriteExt4FileOwned(ctx, runner, workDisk, guestImagePath, mode, 0, 0, data); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("file_sync: write %s → %s: %w", hostPath, guestImagePath, err)
}
}
return nil
}
// copyHostDir recursively copies hostDir into guestTarget on the
// ext4 image via the sudoless toolkit. Each file's source permissions
// are preserved; directories get 0755; ownership is forced to
// root:root. Symlinks are SKIPPED with a warning — os.Lstat identifies
// the entry itself as a link without resolving it, so a symlink
// inside ~/.aws that points at ~/secrets can't leak out of the tree
// the user named. Other special types (devices, FIFOs) are skipped
// silently. Top-level host paths go through os.Stat back in
// runFileSync and still follow, since the user explicitly named that
// path.
func (s *WorkspaceService) copyHostDir(ctx context.Context, vm model.VMRecord, runner system.CommandRunner, imagePath, hostDir, guestTarget string) error {
if err := system.MkdirExt4(ctx, runner, imagePath, guestTarget, 0o755, 0, 0); err != nil {
return err
}
entries, err := os.ReadDir(hostDir)
if err != nil {
return err
}
for _, entry := range entries {
hostChild := filepath.Join(hostDir, entry.Name())
guestChild := path.Join(guestTarget, entry.Name())
info, err := os.Lstat(hostChild)
if err != nil {
return err
}
switch {
case info.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0:
s.warnFileSyncSymlinkSkipped(vm, hostChild)
case info.IsDir():
if err := s.copyHostDir(ctx, vm, runner, imagePath, hostChild, guestChild); err != nil {
return err
}
case info.Mode().IsRegular():
data, err := os.ReadFile(hostChild)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := system.WriteExt4FileOwned(ctx, runner, imagePath, guestChild, info.Mode().Perm(), 0, 0, data); err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
return nil
}
// parseFileSyncMode parses the [[file_sync]] mode field (octal string,
// default "0600"). Returns the parsed FileMode with only the permission
// bits set; callers OR in S_IFREG via WriteExt4FileOwned.
func parseFileSyncMode(raw string) (os.FileMode, error) {
raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
if raw == "" {
raw = "0600"
}
v, err := strconv.ParseUint(raw, 8, 32)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("parse mode %q: %w", raw, err)
}
return os.FileMode(v) & os.ModePerm, nil
}
// expandHostPath expands a leading "~/" against the host user's
// home. Already-absolute paths pass through unchanged.
func expandHostPath(raw, home string) string {
raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
if strings.HasPrefix(raw, "~/") {
return filepath.Join(home, strings.TrimPrefix(raw, "~/"))
}
return raw
}
// guestPathRelativeToRoot returns the guest path as a relative path
// under /root (banger's work disk is mounted at /root in the guest,
// so everything syncable lives there). "~/foo" and "/root/foo" both
// return "foo"; config validation rejects anything outside that
// scope, so the string prefixes are the only forms we see here.
func guestPathRelativeToRoot(raw string) string {
raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
switch {
case raw == "~" || raw == "/root":
return ""
case strings.HasPrefix(raw, "~/"):
return strings.TrimPrefix(raw, "~/")
case strings.HasPrefix(raw, "/root/"):
return strings.TrimPrefix(raw, "/root/")
}
return raw
}
func resolveHostGlobalGitIdentity(ctx context.Context, runner system.CommandRunner) (gitIdentity, error) {
name, err := gitConfigValue(ctx, runner, nil, "user.name")
if err != nil {
return gitIdentity{}, err
}
if name == "" {
return gitIdentity{}, errors.New("host git user.name is empty")
}
email, err := gitConfigValue(ctx, runner, nil, "user.email")
if err != nil {
return gitIdentity{}, err
}
if email == "" {
return gitIdentity{}, errors.New("host git user.email is empty")
}
return gitIdentity{Name: name, Email: email}, nil
}
func gitConfigValue(ctx context.Context, runner system.CommandRunner, extraArgs []string, key string) (string, error) {
args := []string{"config"}
args = append(args, extraArgs...)
args = append(args, "--default", "", "--get", key)
out, err := runner.Run(ctx, "git", args...)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return strings.TrimSpace(string(out)), nil
}
// writeGitIdentity merges user.name + user.email into the on-image
// gitconfig at guestPath. Reads the existing bytes via the ext4
// toolkit (no-op to empty if absent), edits via `git config --file`
// on a host tempfile so any pre-existing unrelated sections are
// preserved verbatim, then writes back through WriteExt4FileOwned
// at 0644 root:root.
func writeGitIdentity(ctx context.Context, runner system.CommandRunner, imagePath, guestPath string, identity gitIdentity) error {
var existing []byte
exists, err := system.Ext4PathExists(ctx, runner, imagePath, guestPath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if exists {
existing, err = system.ReadExt4File(ctx, runner, imagePath, guestPath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
tmpFile, err := os.CreateTemp("", "banger-gitconfig-*")
if err != nil {
return err
}
tmpPath := tmpFile.Name()
if _, err := tmpFile.Write(existing); err != nil {
_ = tmpFile.Close()
_ = os.Remove(tmpPath)
return err
}
if err := tmpFile.Close(); err != nil {
_ = os.Remove(tmpPath)
return err
}
defer os.Remove(tmpPath)
if _, err := runner.Run(ctx, "git", "config", "--file", tmpPath, "user.name", identity.Name); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := runner.Run(ctx, "git", "config", "--file", tmpPath, "user.email", identity.Email); err != nil {
return err
}
merged, err := os.ReadFile(tmpPath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return system.WriteExt4FileOwned(ctx, runner, imagePath, guestPath, 0o644, 0, 0, merged)
}
func (s *WorkspaceService) warnFileSyncSkipped(vm model.VMRecord, hostPath string, err error) {
if s.logger == nil || err == nil {
return
}
s.logger.Warn("file_sync skipped", append(vmLogAttrs(vm), "host_path", hostPath, "error", err.Error())...)
}
// warnFileSyncSymlinkSkipped surfaces a skipped nested symlink to the
// user through the daemon log. Skipping is deliberate — see
// copyHostDir's docstring — but invisible skips would hide a
// "why did my file not show up in the guest?" debugging trail.
func (s *WorkspaceService) warnFileSyncSymlinkSkipped(vm model.VMRecord, hostPath string) {
if s.logger == nil {
return
}
s.logger.Warn("file_sync skipped symlink (would escape the requested tree)", append(vmLogAttrs(vm), "host_path", hostPath)...)
}
func (s *WorkspaceService) warnGitIdentitySyncSkipped(vm model.VMRecord, source string, err error) {
if s.logger == nil || err == nil {
return
}
s.logger.Warn("guest git identity sync skipped", append(vmLogAttrs(vm), "source", source, "error", err.Error())...)
}
func mergeAuthorizedKey(existing, managed []byte) []byte {
managedLine := strings.TrimSpace(string(managed))
if managedLine == "" {
return append([]byte(nil), existing...)
}
lines := strings.Split(strings.ReplaceAll(string(existing), "\r\n", "\n"), "\n")
out := make([]string, 0, len(lines)+1)
found := false
for _, line := range lines {
line = strings.TrimRight(line, "\r")
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(line)
if trimmed == "" {
continue
}
if trimmed == managedLine {
found = true
}
out = append(out, line)
}
if !found {
out = append(out, managedLine)
}
return []byte(strings.Join(out, "\n") + "\n")
}