banger/internal/roothelper/roothelper_test.go
Thales Maciel 853249dec2
roothelper: tighten input validation across privileged RPCs
Defence-in-depth pass over every helper method that touches the host
as root. Each fix narrows what a compromised owner-uid daemon could
ask the helper to do; many close concrete file-ownership and DoS
primitives that the previous validators didn't reach.

Path / identifier validation:
  * priv.fsck_snapshot now requires /dev/mapper/fc-rootfs-* (was
    "is the string non-empty"). e2fsck -fy on /dev/sda1 was the
    motivating exploit.
  * priv.kill_process and priv.signal_process now read
    /proc/<pid>/cmdline and require a "firecracker" substring before
    sending the signal. Killing arbitrary host PIDs (sshd, init, …)
    is no longer a one-RPC primitive.
  * priv.read_ext4_file and priv.write_ext4_files now require the
    image path to live under StateDir or be /dev/mapper/fc-rootfs-*.
  * priv.cleanup_dm_snapshot validates every non-empty Handles field:
    DM name fc-rootfs-*, DM device /dev/mapper/fc-rootfs-*, loops
    /dev/loopN.
  * priv.remove_dm_snapshot accepts only fc-rootfs-* names or
    /dev/mapper/fc-rootfs-* paths.
  * priv.ensure_nat now requires a parsable IPv4 address and a
    banger-prefixed tap.
  * priv.sync_resolver_routing and priv.clear_resolver_routing now
    require a Linux iface-name-shaped bridge name (1–15 chars, no
    whitespace/'/'/':') and, for sync, a parsable resolver address.

Symlink defence:
  * priv.ensure_socket_access now validates the socket path is under
    RuntimeDir and not a symlink. The fcproc layer's chown/chmod
    moves to unix.Open(O_PATH|O_NOFOLLOW) + Fchownat(AT_EMPTY_PATH)
    + Fchmodat via /proc/self/fd, so even a swap of the leaf into a
    symlink between validation and the syscall is refused. The
    local-priv (non-root) fallback uses `chown -h`.
  * priv.cleanup_jailer_chroot rejects symlinks at both the leaf
    (os.Lstat) and intermediate path components (filepath.EvalSymlinks
    + clean-equality). The umount sweep was rewritten from shell
    `umount --recursive --lazy` to direct unix.Unmount(MNT_DETACH |
    UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW) per child mount, deepest-first; the findmnt
    guard remains as the rm-rf safety net. Local-priv mode falls
    back to `sudo umount --lazy`.

Binary validation:
  * validateRootExecutable now opens with O_PATH|O_NOFOLLOW and
    Fstats through the resulting fd. Rejects path-level symlinks and
    narrows the TOCTOU window between validation and the SDK's exec
    to fork+exec time on a healthy host.

Daemon socket:
  * The owner daemon now reads SO_PEERCRED on every accepted
    connection and refuses any UID that isn't 0 or the registered
    owner. Filesystem perms (0600 + ownerUID) already enforced this;
    the check is belt-and-braces in case the socket FD is ever
    leaked to a non-owner process.

Docs:
  * docs/privileges.md walked end-to-end. Each helper RPC's
    Validation gate row reflects what the code actually enforces.
    New section "Running outside the system install" calls out the
    looser dev-mode trust model (NOPASSWD sudoers, helper hardening
    bypassed) so users don't deploy that path on shared hosts.
    Trust list updated to include every new validator.

Tests added: validators (DM-loop, DM-remove-target, DM-handles,
ext4-image-path, iface-name, IPv4, resolver-addr, not-symlink,
firecracker-PID, root-executable variants), the daemon's authorize
path (non-unix conn rejection + unix conn happy path), the umount2
ordering contract (deepest-first + --lazy on the sudo branch), and
positive/negative cases for the chown-no-follow fallback.

Verified end-to-end via `make smoke JOBS=4` on a KVM host.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 14:39:41 -03:00

414 lines
12 KiB
Go

package roothelper
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"banger/internal/daemon/dmsnap"
"banger/internal/firecracker"
"banger/internal/paths"
)
func TestValidateDMDevicePath(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
path string
ok bool
}{
{name: "valid", path: "/dev/mapper/fc-rootfs-test", ok: true},
{name: "wrong_prefix", path: "/dev/mapper/not-banger", ok: false},
{name: "wrong_dir", path: "/tmp/fc-rootfs-test", ok: false},
{name: "relative", path: "fc-rootfs-test", ok: false},
} {
tc := tc
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := validateDMDevicePath(tc.path)
if tc.ok && err != nil {
t.Fatalf("validateDMDevicePath(%q) = %v, want nil", tc.path, err)
}
if !tc.ok && err == nil {
t.Fatalf("validateDMDevicePath(%q) succeeded, want error", tc.path)
}
})
}
}
func TestValidateFirecrackerPID(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
if err := validateFirecrackerPID(0); err == nil {
t.Fatal("validateFirecrackerPID(0) succeeded, want error")
}
if err := validateFirecrackerPID(-1); err == nil {
t.Fatal("validateFirecrackerPID(-1) succeeded, want error")
}
// Self pid points at the go test binary, whose cmdline does not
// contain "firecracker" — rejection proves the helper would refuse
// to kill arbitrary host processes.
if err := validateFirecrackerPID(os.Getpid()); err == nil {
t.Fatal("validateFirecrackerPID(test pid) succeeded, want error")
}
// PID 1 is init/systemd on Linux — a juicy target for a compromised
// daemon, and definitely not firecracker. Make sure we'd refuse.
if err := validateFirecrackerPID(1); err == nil {
t.Fatal("validateFirecrackerPID(1) succeeded, want error")
}
}
// TestValidateRootExecutableRejectsSymlink pins the O_NOFOLLOW
// guarantee: even if the path string passes a textual check, a symlink
// at the leaf is refused before we ever stat the target.
func TestValidateRootExecutableRejectsSymlink(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
regular := filepath.Join(dir, "real")
if err := os.WriteFile(regular, []byte{}, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write regular: %v", err)
}
link := filepath.Join(dir, "link")
if err := os.Symlink(regular, link); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("symlink: %v", err)
}
if err := validateRootExecutable(link); err == nil {
t.Fatal("validateRootExecutable(symlink) succeeded, want error")
}
}
// TestValidateRootExecutableRejectsNonRootOwned exercises the Fstat
// uid check on a file the test user just created: it can't possibly
// be uid 0, so the validator must refuse it. This is the regression
// guard against the previous os.Stat code path drifting back in.
func TestValidateRootExecutableRejectsNonRootOwned(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
if os.Getuid() == 0 {
t.Skip("test runs as root; cannot construct a non-root-owned file in a tempdir we can write")
}
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "binary")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte{}, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
err := validateRootExecutable(path)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("validateRootExecutable(user-owned) succeeded, want error")
}
if !contains(err.Error(), "root-owned") {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want root-owned rejection", err)
}
}
func TestValidateRootExecutableRejectsGroupWritable(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
if os.Getuid() == 0 {
t.Skip("test runs as root; can't construct a non-root-owned file")
}
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "binary")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte{}, 0o775); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
err := validateRootExecutable(path)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("validateRootExecutable(group-writable) succeeded, want error")
}
}
// contains is a local substring helper that mirrors strings.Contains
// without pulling in the package — kept tiny so the test file's
// dependency surface stays close to the thing being tested.
func contains(s, sub string) bool {
for i := 0; i+len(sub) <= len(s); i++ {
if s[i:i+len(sub)] == sub {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func TestValidateLoopDevicePath(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
arg string
ok bool
}{
{name: "loop0", arg: "/dev/loop0", ok: true},
{name: "loop12", arg: "/dev/loop12", ok: true},
{name: "no_index", arg: "/dev/loop", ok: false},
{name: "non_numeric", arg: "/dev/loop-x", ok: false},
{name: "wrong_prefix", arg: "/dev/sda1", ok: false},
{name: "empty", arg: "", ok: false},
} {
tc := tc
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := validateLoopDevicePath(tc.arg)
if tc.ok && err != nil {
t.Fatalf("validateLoopDevicePath(%q) = %v, want nil", tc.arg, err)
}
if !tc.ok && err == nil {
t.Fatalf("validateLoopDevicePath(%q) succeeded, want error", tc.arg)
}
})
}
}
func TestValidateDMRemoveTarget(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
arg string
ok bool
}{
{name: "dm_name", arg: "fc-rootfs-abc", ok: true},
{name: "dm_device_path", arg: "/dev/mapper/fc-rootfs-abc", ok: true},
{name: "wrong_prefix", arg: "not-banger", ok: false},
{name: "device_wrong_prefix", arg: "/dev/mapper/not-banger", ok: false},
{name: "empty", arg: "", ok: false},
} {
tc := tc
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := validateDMRemoveTarget(tc.arg)
if tc.ok && err != nil {
t.Fatalf("validateDMRemoveTarget(%q) = %v, want nil", tc.arg, err)
}
if !tc.ok && err == nil {
t.Fatalf("validateDMRemoveTarget(%q) succeeded, want error", tc.arg)
}
})
}
}
func TestValidateDMSnapshotHandles(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Empty handles are tolerated — the dmsnap layer treats every
// missing field as a no-op for that step.
if err := validateDMSnapshotHandles(dmsnap.Handles{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("validateDMSnapshotHandles(empty) = %v, want nil", err)
}
good := dmsnap.Handles{
BaseLoop: "/dev/loop0",
COWLoop: "/dev/loop1",
DMName: "fc-rootfs-abc",
DMDev: "/dev/mapper/fc-rootfs-abc",
}
if err := validateDMSnapshotHandles(good); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("validateDMSnapshotHandles(good) = %v, want nil", err)
}
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
mutate func(dmsnap.Handles) dmsnap.Handles
wantErr bool
}{
{name: "bad_dm_name", mutate: func(h dmsnap.Handles) dmsnap.Handles {
h.DMName = "rogue"
return h
}, wantErr: true},
{name: "bad_dm_device", mutate: func(h dmsnap.Handles) dmsnap.Handles {
h.DMDev = "/dev/sda1"
return h
}, wantErr: true},
{name: "bad_base_loop", mutate: func(h dmsnap.Handles) dmsnap.Handles {
h.BaseLoop = "/dev/sda1"
return h
}, wantErr: true},
{name: "bad_cow_loop", mutate: func(h dmsnap.Handles) dmsnap.Handles {
h.COWLoop = "/etc/shadow"
return h
}, wantErr: true},
} {
tc := tc
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := validateDMSnapshotHandles(tc.mutate(good))
if tc.wantErr && err == nil {
t.Fatalf("validateDMSnapshotHandles(%s) succeeded, want error", tc.name)
}
if !tc.wantErr && err != nil {
t.Fatalf("validateDMSnapshotHandles(%s) = %v, want nil", tc.name, err)
}
})
}
}
func TestValidateLinuxIfaceName(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
arg string
ok bool
}{
{name: "typical_bridge", arg: "br-banger", ok: true},
{name: "uplink", arg: "enp5s0", ok: true},
{name: "max_len", arg: "a234567890abcde", ok: true}, // 15 chars
{name: "empty", arg: "", ok: false},
{name: "too_long", arg: "a234567890abcdef", ok: false},
{name: "with_slash", arg: "br/0", ok: false},
{name: "with_space", arg: "br 0", ok: false},
{name: "with_colon", arg: "br:0", ok: false},
{name: "dot", arg: ".", ok: false},
{name: "dotdot", arg: "..", ok: false},
{name: "control_char", arg: "br\x01", ok: false},
} {
tc := tc
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := validateLinuxIfaceName(tc.arg)
if tc.ok && err != nil {
t.Fatalf("validateLinuxIfaceName(%q) = %v, want nil", tc.arg, err)
}
if !tc.ok && err == nil {
t.Fatalf("validateLinuxIfaceName(%q) succeeded, want error", tc.arg)
}
})
}
}
func TestValidateIPv4(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
arg string
ok bool
}{
{name: "valid", arg: "172.16.0.2", ok: true},
{name: "with_whitespace", arg: " 10.0.0.1 ", ok: true},
{name: "empty", arg: "", ok: false},
{name: "ipv6", arg: "::1", ok: false},
{name: "garbage", arg: "not-an-ip", ok: false},
{name: "with_cidr", arg: "10.0.0.1/24", ok: false},
} {
tc := tc
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := validateIPv4(tc.arg)
if tc.ok && err != nil {
t.Fatalf("validateIPv4(%q) = %v, want nil", tc.arg, err)
}
if !tc.ok && err == nil {
t.Fatalf("validateIPv4(%q) succeeded, want error", tc.arg)
}
})
}
}
func TestValidateResolverAddr(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
arg string
ok bool
}{
{name: "ipv4", arg: "192.168.1.1", ok: true},
{name: "ipv6", arg: "fe80::1", ok: true},
{name: "empty", arg: "", ok: false},
{name: "garbage", arg: "resolver.example", ok: false},
} {
tc := tc
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := validateResolverAddr(tc.arg)
if tc.ok && err != nil {
t.Fatalf("validateResolverAddr(%q) = %v, want nil", tc.arg, err)
}
if !tc.ok && err == nil {
t.Fatalf("validateResolverAddr(%q) succeeded, want error", tc.arg)
}
})
}
}
func TestValidateExt4ImagePath(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
srv := &Server{}
stateDir := paths.ResolveSystem().StateDir
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
arg string
ok bool
}{
{name: "managed_image", arg: filepath.Join(stateDir, "vms", "abc", "rootfs.ext4"), ok: true},
{name: "managed_dm_device", arg: "/dev/mapper/fc-rootfs-test", ok: true},
{name: "outside_state", arg: "/etc/shadow", ok: false},
{name: "wrong_dm", arg: "/dev/mapper/not-banger", ok: false},
{name: "relative", arg: "rootfs.ext4", ok: false},
{name: "empty", arg: "", ok: false},
} {
tc := tc
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := srv.validateExt4ImagePath(tc.arg)
if tc.ok && err != nil {
t.Fatalf("validateExt4ImagePath(%q) = %v, want nil", tc.arg, err)
}
if !tc.ok && err == nil {
t.Fatalf("validateExt4ImagePath(%q) succeeded, want error", tc.arg)
}
})
}
}
func TestValidateNotSymlink(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
regular := filepath.Join(dir, "real")
if err := os.WriteFile(regular, []byte("ok"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write regular: %v", err)
}
link := filepath.Join(dir, "link")
if err := os.Symlink(regular, link); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("symlink: %v", err)
}
if err := validateNotSymlink(regular); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("validateNotSymlink(real) = %v, want nil", err)
}
if err := validateNotSymlink(link); err == nil {
t.Fatal("validateNotSymlink(symlink) succeeded, want error")
}
if err := validateNotSymlink(filepath.Join(dir, "missing")); err == nil {
t.Fatal("validateNotSymlink(missing) succeeded, want error")
}
// Symlink pointing into the system tree is the threat we care about.
// A daemon-uid attacker plants this kind of link and hopes the helper
// follows it; this test pins the rejection.
hostileLink := filepath.Join(dir, "hostile")
if err := os.Symlink("/etc/shadow", hostileLink); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("symlink: %v", err)
}
if err := validateNotSymlink(hostileLink); err == nil {
t.Fatal("validateNotSymlink(symlink-to-/etc/shadow) succeeded, want error")
}
}
func TestValidateLaunchDrivePathAllowsManagedRootDMDevice(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
srv := &Server{}
if err := srv.validateLaunchDrivePath(firecracker.DriveConfig{
ID: "rootfs",
Path: "/dev/mapper/fc-rootfs-test",
IsRoot: true,
}, "/var/lib/banger"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("validateLaunchDrivePath(root dm) = %v, want nil", err)
}
if err := srv.validateLaunchDrivePath(firecracker.DriveConfig{
ID: "work",
Path: "/dev/mapper/fc-rootfs-test",
IsRoot: false,
}, "/var/lib/banger"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("validateLaunchDrivePath(non-root dm) succeeded, want error")
}
}