banger/internal/updater/verify_signature_test.go
Thales Maciel 8ed351ea47
updater: cosign-blob signature verification on SHA256SUMS
Closes the v0.1.0 cosign requirement. Every banger update download
now goes through ECDSA-P256 verification before any binary is
trusted: SHA256SUMS.sig is fetched, base64-decoded, and verified
against the embedded BangerReleasePublicKey.

  * BangerReleasePublicKey: PEM-encoded ECDSA public key embedded
    at compile time. The current value is a sentinel PLACEHOLDER —
    the maintainer must replace it with the output of
    `cosign generate-key-pair`'s cosign.pub before cutting v0.1.0,
    and re-cut. Until they do, every `banger update` refuses with
    ErrSignatureRequired ("the maintainer must replace it and
    re-cut a release before update can proceed"). Loud refusal
    beats silent acceptance.
  * VerifyBlobSignature: parses the embedded public key, base64-
    decodes the signature, computes SHA256(body), runs ecdsa
    .VerifyASN1. cosign sign-blob produces the format
    VerifyASN1 verifies natively (ASN.1-DER encoded ECDSA over
    a SHA256 digest), so no third-party crypto deps needed.
  * FetchAndVerifySignature: pulls the signature URL from the
    release manifest entry, fetches it (1 KiB cap), and verifies
    against sumsBody. Refuses outright when sha256sums_sig_url is
    empty — v0.1.0 contract requires every release to be signed,
    and an unsigned release is a manifest publishing bug we'd
    rather catch loudly than silently accept.
  * Wired into banger update: sumsBody captured from
    DownloadRelease, immediately fed into FetchAndVerifySignature.
    A failed verification removes the staged tarball before
    returning so it can't be reused.
  * BangerReleasePublicKey is var (not const) only to support tests
    that swap in a generated keypair; production sets it at compile
    time and never mutates it.

Tests: placeholder-key path returns ErrSignatureRequired; happy
path with a fresh in-test ECDSA keypair verifies a real
sign-then-verify; tampered body, wrong key, and three malformed
signature shapes (not-base64, empty, garbage-DER) all reject.

Maintainer-cut workflow documented in BangerReleasePublicKey's
comment: cosign generate-key-pair → paste cosign.pub into the
constant → at release time, cosign sign-blob --key cosign.key
SHA256SUMS > SHA256SUMS.sig and publish.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-29 12:37:53 -03:00

120 lines
3.6 KiB
Go

package updater
import (
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// generateTestKey produces an ECDSA P-256 keypair in PEM form,
// matching the shape `cosign generate-key-pair` emits for the public
// half. The private half stays in-test for signing.
func generateTestKey(t *testing.T) (privKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, pubPEM string) {
t.Helper()
priv, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate key: %v", err)
}
der, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(&priv.PublicKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal public key: %v", err)
}
pubPEM = string(pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "PUBLIC KEY", Bytes: der}))
return priv, pubPEM
}
// signBlob mimics `cosign sign-blob`'s output: base64-encoded ASN.1-DER
// ECDSA signature over SHA256(body).
func signBlob(t *testing.T, priv *ecdsa.PrivateKey, body []byte) string {
t.Helper()
digest := sha256.Sum256(body)
sig, err := ecdsa.SignASN1(rand.Reader, priv, digest[:])
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("sign: %v", err)
}
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(sig)
}
func TestVerifyBlobSignaturePlaceholderRefuses(t *testing.T) {
// The default constant in this binary is the placeholder. Any
// verify call must refuse with ErrSignatureRequired so an
// un-rotated build can't silently accept anything.
err := VerifyBlobSignature([]byte("body"), []byte("sig"))
if !errors.Is(err, ErrSignatureRequired) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrSignatureRequired", err)
}
}
func TestVerifyBlobSignatureHappyPath(t *testing.T) {
priv, pubPEM := generateTestKey(t)
prev := BangerReleasePublicKey
BangerReleasePublicKey = pubPEM
defer func() { BangerReleasePublicKey = prev }()
body := []byte("SHA256SUMS body bytes")
sig := signBlob(t, priv, body)
if err := VerifyBlobSignature(body, []byte(sig)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("VerifyBlobSignature: %v", err)
}
}
func TestVerifyBlobSignatureRejectsTamperedBody(t *testing.T) {
priv, pubPEM := generateTestKey(t)
prev := BangerReleasePublicKey
BangerReleasePublicKey = pubPEM
defer func() { BangerReleasePublicKey = prev }()
body := []byte("original body")
sig := signBlob(t, priv, body)
tampered := []byte("tampered body")
err := VerifyBlobSignature(tampered, []byte(sig))
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "does not verify") {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want signature-mismatch", err)
}
}
func TestVerifyBlobSignatureRejectsWrongKey(t *testing.T) {
// Sign with one key, verify with a different one.
signingPriv, _ := generateTestKey(t)
_, otherPubPEM := generateTestKey(t)
prev := BangerReleasePublicKey
BangerReleasePublicKey = otherPubPEM
defer func() { BangerReleasePublicKey = prev }()
body := []byte("body")
sig := signBlob(t, signingPriv, body)
err := VerifyBlobSignature(body, []byte(sig))
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "does not verify") {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want wrong-key rejection", err)
}
}
func TestVerifyBlobSignatureRejectsMalformed(t *testing.T) {
_, pubPEM := generateTestKey(t)
prev := BangerReleasePublicKey
BangerReleasePublicKey = pubPEM
defer func() { BangerReleasePublicKey = prev }()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
sig string
}{
{name: "not_base64", sig: "!!!not_b64!!!"},
{name: "empty", sig: ""},
{name: "garbage_bytes", sig: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte{0x01, 0x02, 0x03})},
} {
tc := tc
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := VerifyBlobSignature([]byte("body"), []byte(tc.sig))
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error for %s; got success", tc.name)
}
})
}
}