priv.ensure_bridge / priv.create_tap accepted the daemon's network
config triple (BridgeName, BridgeIP, CIDR) and forwarded it straight
to `ip link` / `ip addr` / `ip link set master`. Argv-style exec
ruled out shell injection, but the kernel happily honours those
commands against any iface a compromised owner-uid daemon names —
including eth0/docker0/lo. Concretely:
* priv.ensure_bridge could `ip link set <iface> up` against any
host interface and `ip addr add` arbitrary IP/CIDR to it.
* priv.create_tap could `ip link set <new-tap> master <iface>`,
bridging the per-VM tap into the host's primary LAN so the
guest sees host-local broadcast traffic.
* priv.sync_resolver_routing / priv.clear_resolver_routing only
enforced "name shaped like a Linux iface" — no banger constraint.
New validators (single chokepoint via validateNetworkConfig):
* validateBangerBridgeName: name must equal "br-fc" or start with
"br-fc-". Stops a compromised daemon from naming any host iface
in these RPCs. Users with a custom bridge keep the prefix.
* validateCIDRPrefix: numeric in [8, 32]. Wider prefixes would
silently widen the bridge subnet beyond what the daemon intends.
* validateNetworkConfig bundles bridge-name + validateIPv4 +
validateCIDRPrefix so every helper RPC that takes the triple
stays in lockstep.
Wired into methodEnsureBridge, methodCreateTap, and the resolver-
routing pair (replacing the older validateLinuxIfaceName-only check
with the stricter banger-bridge check).
docs/privileges.md updated: the helper-RPC table rows now spell out
the banger-managed bridge constraint, and the trust list includes
the new validators.
Tests: TestValidateBangerBridgeName (default + suffixed accepted,
host ifaces / wrong prefix / oversized rejected), TestValidate
CIDRPrefix (boundary + non-numeric + IPv6-style 64 rejected),
TestValidateNetworkConfig (happy path + each-field-bad cases).
Smoke at JOBS=4 still green — banger's defaults sail through the
new gate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
670 lines
20 KiB
Go
670 lines
20 KiB
Go
package roothelper
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import (
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"testing"
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"banger/internal/daemon/dmsnap"
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"banger/internal/firecracker"
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"banger/internal/paths"
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)
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func TestValidateDMDevicePath(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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for _, tc := range []struct {
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name string
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path string
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ok bool
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}{
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{name: "valid", path: "/dev/mapper/fc-rootfs-test", ok: true},
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{name: "wrong_prefix", path: "/dev/mapper/not-banger", ok: false},
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{name: "wrong_dir", path: "/tmp/fc-rootfs-test", ok: false},
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{name: "relative", path: "fc-rootfs-test", ok: false},
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} {
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tc := tc
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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err := validateDMDevicePath(tc.path)
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if tc.ok && err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("validateDMDevicePath(%q) = %v, want nil", tc.path, err)
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}
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if !tc.ok && err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("validateDMDevicePath(%q) succeeded, want error", tc.path)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestValidateFirecrackerPID(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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if err := validateFirecrackerPID(0); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("validateFirecrackerPID(0) succeeded, want error")
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}
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if err := validateFirecrackerPID(-1); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("validateFirecrackerPID(-1) succeeded, want error")
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}
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// Self pid points at the go test binary, whose cmdline does not
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// contain "firecracker" — rejection proves the helper would refuse
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// to kill arbitrary host processes.
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if err := validateFirecrackerPID(os.Getpid()); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("validateFirecrackerPID(test pid) succeeded, want error")
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}
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// PID 1 is init/systemd on Linux — a juicy target for a compromised
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// daemon, and definitely not firecracker. Make sure we'd refuse.
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if err := validateFirecrackerPID(1); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("validateFirecrackerPID(1) succeeded, want error")
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}
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}
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// TestValidateRootExecutableRejectsSymlink pins the O_NOFOLLOW
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// guarantee: even if the path string passes a textual check, a symlink
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// at the leaf is refused before we ever stat the target.
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func TestValidateRootExecutableRejectsSymlink(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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dir := t.TempDir()
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regular := filepath.Join(dir, "real")
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if err := os.WriteFile(regular, []byte{}, 0o755); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("write regular: %v", err)
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}
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link := filepath.Join(dir, "link")
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if err := os.Symlink(regular, link); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("symlink: %v", err)
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}
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if err := validateRootExecutable(link); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("validateRootExecutable(symlink) succeeded, want error")
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}
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}
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// TestValidateRootExecutableRejectsNonRootOwned exercises the Fstat
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// uid check on a file the test user just created: it can't possibly
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// be uid 0, so the validator must refuse it. This is the regression
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// guard against the previous os.Stat code path drifting back in.
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func TestValidateRootExecutableRejectsNonRootOwned(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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if os.Getuid() == 0 {
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t.Skip("test runs as root; cannot construct a non-root-owned file in a tempdir we can write")
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}
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path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "binary")
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if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte{}, 0o755); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
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}
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err := validateRootExecutable(path)
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("validateRootExecutable(user-owned) succeeded, want error")
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}
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if !contains(err.Error(), "root-owned") {
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t.Fatalf("err = %v, want root-owned rejection", err)
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}
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}
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func TestValidateRootExecutableRejectsGroupWritable(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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if os.Getuid() == 0 {
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t.Skip("test runs as root; can't construct a non-root-owned file")
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}
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path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "binary")
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if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte{}, 0o775); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
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}
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err := validateRootExecutable(path)
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("validateRootExecutable(group-writable) succeeded, want error")
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}
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}
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// contains is a local substring helper that mirrors strings.Contains
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// without pulling in the package — kept tiny so the test file's
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// dependency surface stays close to the thing being tested.
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func contains(s, sub string) bool {
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for i := 0; i+len(sub) <= len(s); i++ {
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if s[i:i+len(sub)] == sub {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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func TestValidateSignalName(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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for _, tc := range []struct {
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name string
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arg string
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ok bool
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}{
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{name: "TERM", arg: "TERM", ok: true},
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{name: "SIGTERM", arg: "SIGTERM", ok: true},
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{name: "lowercase_kill", arg: "kill", ok: true},
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{name: "with_whitespace", arg: " HUP ", ok: true},
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{name: "USR1", arg: "USR1", ok: true},
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{name: "ABRT", arg: "ABRT", ok: true},
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{name: "empty", arg: "", ok: false},
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{name: "numeric_9", arg: "9", ok: false},
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{name: "STOP_DoS", arg: "STOP", ok: false},
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{name: "CONT", arg: "CONT", ok: false},
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{name: "realtime", arg: "RTMIN+1", ok: false},
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{name: "garbage", arg: "FOOBAR", ok: false},
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} {
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tc := tc
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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err := validateSignalName(tc.arg)
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if tc.ok && err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("validateSignalName(%q) = %v, want nil", tc.arg, err)
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}
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if !tc.ok && err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("validateSignalName(%q) succeeded, want error", tc.arg)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestExtractFirecrackerAPISock(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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for _, tc := range []struct {
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name string
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cmdline string
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want string
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}{
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{name: "long_form_space", cmdline: "firecracker --api-sock /run/banger/fc-abc.sock --id abc", want: "/run/banger/fc-abc.sock"},
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{name: "long_form_equals", cmdline: "firecracker --api-sock=/run/banger/fc-abc.sock --id abc", want: "/run/banger/fc-abc.sock"},
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{name: "short_form", cmdline: "firecracker -a /run/banger/fc-abc.sock --id abc", want: "/run/banger/fc-abc.sock"},
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{name: "absent", cmdline: "firecracker --id abc", want: ""},
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{name: "trailing_flag", cmdline: "firecracker --api-sock", want: ""},
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{name: "empty", cmdline: "", want: ""},
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} {
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tc := tc
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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got := extractFirecrackerAPISock(tc.cmdline)
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if got != tc.want {
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t.Fatalf("extractFirecrackerAPISock(%q) = %q, want %q", tc.cmdline, got, tc.want)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestPathIsUnder(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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for _, tc := range []struct {
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name string
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p string
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root string
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want bool
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}{
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{name: "exact", p: "/var/lib/banger", root: "/var/lib/banger", want: true},
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{name: "nested", p: "/var/lib/banger/jail/x", root: "/var/lib/banger", want: true},
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{name: "sibling", p: "/var/lib/banger-other", root: "/var/lib/banger", want: false},
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{name: "outside", p: "/etc/passwd", root: "/var/lib/banger", want: false},
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{name: "empty_root", p: "/anywhere", root: "", want: false},
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} {
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tc := tc
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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if got := pathIsUnder(tc.p, tc.root); got != tc.want {
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t.Fatalf("pathIsUnder(%q, %q) = %v, want %v", tc.p, tc.root, got, tc.want)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestValidateLoopDevicePath(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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for _, tc := range []struct {
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name string
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arg string
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ok bool
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}{
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{name: "loop0", arg: "/dev/loop0", ok: true},
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{name: "loop12", arg: "/dev/loop12", ok: true},
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{name: "no_index", arg: "/dev/loop", ok: false},
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{name: "non_numeric", arg: "/dev/loop-x", ok: false},
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{name: "wrong_prefix", arg: "/dev/sda1", ok: false},
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{name: "empty", arg: "", ok: false},
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} {
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tc := tc
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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err := validateLoopDevicePath(tc.arg)
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if tc.ok && err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("validateLoopDevicePath(%q) = %v, want nil", tc.arg, err)
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}
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if !tc.ok && err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("validateLoopDevicePath(%q) succeeded, want error", tc.arg)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestValidateDMRemoveTarget(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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for _, tc := range []struct {
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name string
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arg string
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ok bool
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}{
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{name: "dm_name", arg: "fc-rootfs-abc", ok: true},
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{name: "dm_device_path", arg: "/dev/mapper/fc-rootfs-abc", ok: true},
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{name: "wrong_prefix", arg: "not-banger", ok: false},
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{name: "device_wrong_prefix", arg: "/dev/mapper/not-banger", ok: false},
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{name: "empty", arg: "", ok: false},
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} {
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tc := tc
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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err := validateDMRemoveTarget(tc.arg)
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if tc.ok && err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("validateDMRemoveTarget(%q) = %v, want nil", tc.arg, err)
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}
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if !tc.ok && err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("validateDMRemoveTarget(%q) succeeded, want error", tc.arg)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestValidateDMSnapshotHandles(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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// Empty handles are tolerated — the dmsnap layer treats every
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// missing field as a no-op for that step.
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if err := validateDMSnapshotHandles(dmsnap.Handles{}); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("validateDMSnapshotHandles(empty) = %v, want nil", err)
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}
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good := dmsnap.Handles{
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BaseLoop: "/dev/loop0",
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COWLoop: "/dev/loop1",
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DMName: "fc-rootfs-abc",
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DMDev: "/dev/mapper/fc-rootfs-abc",
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}
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if err := validateDMSnapshotHandles(good); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("validateDMSnapshotHandles(good) = %v, want nil", err)
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}
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for _, tc := range []struct {
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name string
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mutate func(dmsnap.Handles) dmsnap.Handles
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wantErr bool
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}{
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{name: "bad_dm_name", mutate: func(h dmsnap.Handles) dmsnap.Handles {
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h.DMName = "rogue"
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return h
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}, wantErr: true},
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{name: "bad_dm_device", mutate: func(h dmsnap.Handles) dmsnap.Handles {
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h.DMDev = "/dev/sda1"
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return h
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}, wantErr: true},
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{name: "bad_base_loop", mutate: func(h dmsnap.Handles) dmsnap.Handles {
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h.BaseLoop = "/dev/sda1"
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return h
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}, wantErr: true},
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{name: "bad_cow_loop", mutate: func(h dmsnap.Handles) dmsnap.Handles {
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h.COWLoop = "/etc/shadow"
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return h
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}, wantErr: true},
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} {
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tc := tc
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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err := validateDMSnapshotHandles(tc.mutate(good))
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if tc.wantErr && err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("validateDMSnapshotHandles(%s) succeeded, want error", tc.name)
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}
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if !tc.wantErr && err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("validateDMSnapshotHandles(%s) = %v, want nil", tc.name, err)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// TestValidateManagedPathRejectsSymlinkLeaf pins the leaf-symlink
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// rejection: even when the path string sits inside a managed root, a
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// symlink at the final component must be refused. Otherwise a
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// daemon-UID attacker could plant `<StateDir>/foo -> /etc/shadow` and
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// get the helper to drive privileged tooling against host files.
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func TestValidateManagedPathRejectsSymlinkLeaf(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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srv := &Server{}
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root := t.TempDir()
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target := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "outside")
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if err := os.WriteFile(target, []byte("secret"), 0o600); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("write target: %v", err)
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}
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link := filepath.Join(root, "leak")
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if err := os.Symlink(target, link); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("symlink: %v", err)
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}
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err := srv.validateManagedPath(link, root)
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("validateManagedPath(symlink leaf) succeeded, want error")
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}
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}
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// TestValidateManagedPathRejectsSymlinkIntermediate pins ancestor
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// symlink rejection. Without the walk, an attacker plants
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// `<StateDir>/dir -> /etc` and a path like `<StateDir>/dir/passwd`
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// passes the textual prefix check but resolves to /etc/passwd at op
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// time.
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func TestValidateManagedPathRejectsSymlinkIntermediate(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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srv := &Server{}
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root := t.TempDir()
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target := t.TempDir()
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link := filepath.Join(root, "redirect")
|
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if err := os.Symlink(target, link); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("symlink: %v", err)
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}
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err := srv.validateManagedPath(filepath.Join(link, "passwd"), root)
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("validateManagedPath(symlink intermediate) succeeded, want error")
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}
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}
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// TestValidateManagedPathToleratesMissingLeaf confirms ENOENT does
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// not flip the validator into a fail. Several callers pass paths
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// firecracker (or the helper's own staging) creates AFTER validation
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// — sockets, log files, kernel hard-link targets — and a strict
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// existence check would break those flows.
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func TestValidateManagedPathToleratesMissingLeaf(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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srv := &Server{}
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root := t.TempDir()
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missing := filepath.Join(root, "deeper", "not-yet")
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if err := srv.validateManagedPath(missing, root); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("validateManagedPath(missing leaf) = %v, want nil", err)
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}
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}
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|
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// TestValidateManagedPathPassesPlainSubpath is the happy path: a
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// regular file inside a real subdir should sail through the new walk.
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func TestValidateManagedPathPassesPlainSubpath(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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srv := &Server{}
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root := t.TempDir()
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subdir := filepath.Join(root, "vms", "abc")
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if err := os.MkdirAll(subdir, 0o755); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("mkdir: %v", err)
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}
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leaf := filepath.Join(subdir, "rootfs.ext4")
|
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if err := os.WriteFile(leaf, []byte("data"), 0o644); err != nil {
|
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t.Fatalf("write leaf: %v", err)
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}
|
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if err := srv.validateManagedPath(leaf, root); err != nil {
|
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t.Fatalf("validateManagedPath(plain subpath) = %v, want nil", err)
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}
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}
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|
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func TestValidateBangerBridgeName(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
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|
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
arg string
|
|
ok bool
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|
}{
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|
{name: "default", arg: "br-fc", ok: true},
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|
{name: "suffixed", arg: "br-fc-alt", ok: true},
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|
{name: "with_whitespace", arg: " br-fc ", ok: true},
|
|
{name: "wrong_prefix", arg: "br0", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "host_iface", arg: "eth0", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "docker", arg: "docker0", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "loopback", arg: "lo", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "empty", arg: "", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "br_dash_only", arg: "br-", ok: false}, // not "br-fc" exactly
|
|
{name: "almost_match", arg: "br-fcx", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "with_slash", arg: "br-fc/x", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "too_long", arg: "br-fc-aaaaaaaaaa", ok: false}, // 16 chars
|
|
} {
|
|
tc := tc
|
|
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
err := validateBangerBridgeName(tc.arg)
|
|
if tc.ok && err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("validateBangerBridgeName(%q) = %v, want nil", tc.arg, err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !tc.ok && err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("validateBangerBridgeName(%q) succeeded, want error", tc.arg)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidateCIDRPrefix(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
arg string
|
|
ok bool
|
|
}{
|
|
{name: "default_24", arg: "24", ok: true},
|
|
{name: "min_8", arg: "8", ok: true},
|
|
{name: "max_32", arg: "32", ok: true},
|
|
{name: "with_whitespace", arg: " 16 ", ok: true},
|
|
{name: "below_min", arg: "7", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "above_max", arg: "33", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "non_numeric", arg: "abc", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "ipv6_prefix", arg: "64", ok: false}, // outside [8, 32]
|
|
{name: "with_slash", arg: "/24", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "empty", arg: "", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "negative", arg: "-1", ok: false},
|
|
} {
|
|
tc := tc
|
|
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
err := validateCIDRPrefix(tc.arg)
|
|
if tc.ok && err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("validateCIDRPrefix(%q) = %v, want nil", tc.arg, err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !tc.ok && err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("validateCIDRPrefix(%q) succeeded, want error", tc.arg)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidateNetworkConfig(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
good := NetworkConfig{
|
|
BridgeName: "br-fc",
|
|
BridgeIP: "172.16.0.1",
|
|
CIDR: "24",
|
|
}
|
|
if err := validateNetworkConfig(good); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("validateNetworkConfig(default) = %v, want nil", err)
|
|
}
|
|
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
mutate func(NetworkConfig) NetworkConfig
|
|
}{
|
|
{name: "bad_bridge", mutate: func(c NetworkConfig) NetworkConfig { c.BridgeName = "eth0"; return c }},
|
|
{name: "bad_ip", mutate: func(c NetworkConfig) NetworkConfig { c.BridgeIP = "::1"; return c }},
|
|
{name: "bad_cidr", mutate: func(c NetworkConfig) NetworkConfig { c.CIDR = "/24"; return c }},
|
|
{name: "missing_ip", mutate: func(c NetworkConfig) NetworkConfig { c.BridgeIP = ""; return c }},
|
|
} {
|
|
tc := tc
|
|
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
if err := validateNetworkConfig(tc.mutate(good)); err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("validateNetworkConfig(%s) succeeded, want error", tc.name)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidateLinuxIfaceName(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
arg string
|
|
ok bool
|
|
}{
|
|
{name: "typical_bridge", arg: "br-banger", ok: true},
|
|
{name: "uplink", arg: "enp5s0", ok: true},
|
|
{name: "max_len", arg: "a234567890abcde", ok: true}, // 15 chars
|
|
{name: "empty", arg: "", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "too_long", arg: "a234567890abcdef", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "with_slash", arg: "br/0", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "with_space", arg: "br 0", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "with_colon", arg: "br:0", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "dot", arg: ".", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "dotdot", arg: "..", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "control_char", arg: "br\x01", ok: false},
|
|
} {
|
|
tc := tc
|
|
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
err := validateLinuxIfaceName(tc.arg)
|
|
if tc.ok && err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("validateLinuxIfaceName(%q) = %v, want nil", tc.arg, err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !tc.ok && err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("validateLinuxIfaceName(%q) succeeded, want error", tc.arg)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidateIPv4(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
arg string
|
|
ok bool
|
|
}{
|
|
{name: "valid", arg: "172.16.0.2", ok: true},
|
|
{name: "with_whitespace", arg: " 10.0.0.1 ", ok: true},
|
|
{name: "empty", arg: "", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "ipv6", arg: "::1", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "garbage", arg: "not-an-ip", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "with_cidr", arg: "10.0.0.1/24", ok: false},
|
|
} {
|
|
tc := tc
|
|
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
err := validateIPv4(tc.arg)
|
|
if tc.ok && err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("validateIPv4(%q) = %v, want nil", tc.arg, err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !tc.ok && err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("validateIPv4(%q) succeeded, want error", tc.arg)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidateResolverAddr(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
arg string
|
|
ok bool
|
|
}{
|
|
{name: "ipv4", arg: "192.168.1.1", ok: true},
|
|
{name: "ipv6", arg: "fe80::1", ok: true},
|
|
{name: "empty", arg: "", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "garbage", arg: "resolver.example", ok: false},
|
|
} {
|
|
tc := tc
|
|
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
err := validateResolverAddr(tc.arg)
|
|
if tc.ok && err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("validateResolverAddr(%q) = %v, want nil", tc.arg, err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !tc.ok && err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("validateResolverAddr(%q) succeeded, want error", tc.arg)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidateExt4ImagePath(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
srv := &Server{}
|
|
stateDir := paths.ResolveSystem().StateDir
|
|
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
arg string
|
|
ok bool
|
|
}{
|
|
{name: "managed_image", arg: filepath.Join(stateDir, "vms", "abc", "rootfs.ext4"), ok: true},
|
|
{name: "managed_dm_device", arg: "/dev/mapper/fc-rootfs-test", ok: true},
|
|
{name: "outside_state", arg: "/etc/shadow", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "wrong_dm", arg: "/dev/mapper/not-banger", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "relative", arg: "rootfs.ext4", ok: false},
|
|
{name: "empty", arg: "", ok: false},
|
|
} {
|
|
tc := tc
|
|
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
err := srv.validateExt4ImagePath(tc.arg)
|
|
if tc.ok && err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("validateExt4ImagePath(%q) = %v, want nil", tc.arg, err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !tc.ok && err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("validateExt4ImagePath(%q) succeeded, want error", tc.arg)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidateNotSymlink(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
dir := t.TempDir()
|
|
regular := filepath.Join(dir, "real")
|
|
if err := os.WriteFile(regular, []byte("ok"), 0o600); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("write regular: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
link := filepath.Join(dir, "link")
|
|
if err := os.Symlink(regular, link); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("symlink: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := validateNotSymlink(regular); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("validateNotSymlink(real) = %v, want nil", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := validateNotSymlink(link); err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("validateNotSymlink(symlink) succeeded, want error")
|
|
}
|
|
if err := validateNotSymlink(filepath.Join(dir, "missing")); err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("validateNotSymlink(missing) succeeded, want error")
|
|
}
|
|
// Symlink pointing into the system tree is the threat we care about.
|
|
// A daemon-uid attacker plants this kind of link and hopes the helper
|
|
// follows it; this test pins the rejection.
|
|
hostileLink := filepath.Join(dir, "hostile")
|
|
if err := os.Symlink("/etc/shadow", hostileLink); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("symlink: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := validateNotSymlink(hostileLink); err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("validateNotSymlink(symlink-to-/etc/shadow) succeeded, want error")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidateLaunchDrivePathAllowsManagedRootDMDevice(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
srv := &Server{}
|
|
if err := srv.validateLaunchDrivePath(firecracker.DriveConfig{
|
|
ID: "rootfs",
|
|
Path: "/dev/mapper/fc-rootfs-test",
|
|
IsRoot: true,
|
|
}, "/var/lib/banger"); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("validateLaunchDrivePath(root dm) = %v, want nil", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := srv.validateLaunchDrivePath(firecracker.DriveConfig{
|
|
ID: "work",
|
|
Path: "/dev/mapper/fc-rootfs-test",
|
|
IsRoot: false,
|
|
}, "/var/lib/banger"); err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("validateLaunchDrivePath(non-root dm) succeeded, want error")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|